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ORIGINALIST  OR  ORIGINAL:  THE  DIFFICULTIES
OF  RECONCILING CITIZENS  UNITED  WITH
CORPORATE  LAW  HISTORY
Leo E. Strine, Jr.* & Nicholas Walter**
INTRODUCTION
Much has and will continue to be written about the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC.1  In that decision, the
Court held that the part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (the
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Fellow, Harvard Program on Corporate Governance; Adjunct Professor, Vanderbilt
University School of Law; Henry Crown Fellow, Aspen Institute.
** Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz. The authors are grateful for the
invaluable assistance of Elane Boulden, Andrew Berni, Dorothy Shapiro, and Sonia
Steinway, and for helpful comments from Bill Allen, Bill Bratton, Bill Budinger, Robert
Clark, Jill Fisch, Ronald Gilson, Jeff Gordon, Joe Grundfest, Larry Hamermesh, Jonathan
Lipson, Ian Nussbaum, Miguel Padro, Alan Palmiter, Ed Rock, Lynn Stout, and Eric Talley.
1 558 U.S. 310 (2010).  For a review of the literature spawned by Citizens United, see
generally ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION (2014); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: The Ten-
sion Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 335
(2015).  Various authors have briefly criticized Citizens United in originalist terms. See, e.g.,
Joseph F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Critique of Citizens United, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 765,
780–84 (2013) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s originalism); Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United
and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 485, 497 (“[A]ny Justice attempting
seriously to employ an originalist analysis in Citizens United would also have had to uphold
the legislation.”); Amanda D. Johnson, Comment, Originalism and Citizens United: The
Struggle of Corporate Personhood, 7 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 187 (2010). We provide a comprehen-
sive critique.  The most detailed treatments of this topic of which we are aware are Ruth H.
Bloch & Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment (2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), and Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original
Understanding, and the Problem of Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, (2012).  As the title of
877
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“McCain-Feingold Act”) that prohibited corporations from making expendi-
tures expressly in favor of the election or defeat of political candidates,
except through corporate-sponsored political action committees that raised
specific funds for that purpose, was unconstitutional as applied to the non-
profit advocacy corporation before the Court.2 In its sweeping ruling, the
Court suggested that the managers of even for-profit corporations whose
shares are publicly traded have a First Amendment right to spend unlimited
amounts of treasury funds to influence the political process, including to
advocate the election or defeat of particular candidates for office.
In this Article, we focus on a specific question raised by Citizens United,
which is whether the Supreme Court’s decision can be justified solely by
application of the originalist method of constitutional interpretation, or
whether it can only be explained by giving substantial weight to a more mod-
ern, evolved understanding of the relevant constitutional provisions.  The dis-
sent in Citizens United, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, argued that the decision could not be
defended on originalist grounds.  In Justice Stevens’s view, the Framers “had
little trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they
constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the
free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind.”3  In a concur-
ring opinion, originalist Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito and in relevant
part by Justice Thomas, claimed that the majority’s result was faithful to
originalism as they articulate it.4  Justice Scalia argued that there was no his-
torical evidence that the government could restrict the speech of business
corporations.
In addressing this subject, we acknowledge that Justices Scalia and Alito
concurred in the majority opinion, an opinion that itself did not rely upon
the originalist methodology, and that the originalist concurrence was crafted
as a rebuttal to Justice Stevens’s dissent, which argued that the majority opin-
ion was unhistorical.  Nevertheless, because Justices Scalia and Thomas, and
originalist methodology, have such influence in current jurisprudence, we
believe it is important to consider whether Citizens United can be rationalized
on originalist grounds.  After all, originalists claim that their method is the
only method faithful to the idea that the law is something determinable as
the work of certain legitimately empowered authorities, and not whatever the
current group of judges decides to say it is.
their excellent essay suggests, Bloch and Lamoreaux focus on developments in the 1860s
and after.  Our analysis starts earlier, but we are indebted to them.
2 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006) (“It is unlawful for . . . any corporation . . . or any
labor organization, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any [fed-
eral] election . . . or in connection with any primary election or political convention or
caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices . . . .”).
3 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 385–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Originalism is an interpretive doctrine commonly associated with those
who describe themselves as conservative.5  In a prior article, we discussed
whether Citizens United, usually seen as a product of the “conservative” wing
of the Supreme Court, could be reconciled with the predominant conserva-
tive corporate law theory, and found that it could not.6  In this Article we
explore whether the outcome in Citizens United can be justified by reference
to the originalist interpretive principles as embraced by Justice Scalia and
other prominent conservatives.7
Originalist interpretation, as applied by Justice Scalia, entails a two-pro-
nged approach.8  In the first instance, if the constitutional text is unambigu-
ous and answers the question posed, the Court must give the text its
unambiguous meaning.  If, however, the text is ambiguous or does not
directly address the question before the Court, then the Court is to do its best
to interpret the text consistently with the understanding at the time of its
adoption.  Contemporaneous societal understanding is therefore what is rele-
vant to originalists such as Justice Scalia, who eschew the notion of a “living
constitution” whose meaning changes by virtue of changing societal norms
and judicial interpretations rather than changes to constitutional text.
Here, we observe that the text of the First Amendment does not specifi-
cally address the question of whether business corporations have the right to
make unlimited treasury expenditures advocating the election or defeat of
political candidates.  More broadly, we note that the Constitution does not
indicate that entities created and chartered by authority of legislation, as
opposed to actual human beings, have any free speech rights at all.9  We thus
examine whether Citizens United can be rationalized as originalist by refer-
ence to the historical understanding of the legal status and social role of the
business corporation—including its ability to exercise constitutional rights—
as of two critical time periods.  The first is 1789 to 1791, when the First
5 It is, for example, associated with Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia. See infra Section
II.A.
6 Strine & Walter, supra note 1.
7 Originalism now has many variants, not all of them conservative. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Originalism for Liberals, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 28, 1998), https://newrepublic
.com/article/64084/originalism-liberals (reviewing multiple works by Akhil Reed Amar).
For example, Professor Balkin has written incisive works adopting a form of originalism
that comes from a very different perspective. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM
(2011); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007);
Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427
(2007).
8 See infra Section II.A.
9 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Notably
absent from this formulation (and the rest of the Constitution) is any mention of corpora-
tions, as distinguished scholars have pointed out. See, e.g., Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The
Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation
After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1352 (1979).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 4  4-APR-16 13:24
880 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
Amendment was submitted to the states and became part of our nation’s
Constitution.  The second is 1866 to 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment
was added to the Constitution.  These periods are relevant because Citizens
United suggests that the First Amendment gave rights to for-profit corpora-
tions in part by virtue of rulings treating business corporations as persons
under the Fourteenth Amendment and entitled to raise certain constitu-
tional rights against state intrusion by virtue of that Amendment.10
At each historical stage, we find that the relevant text is not clear that
business corporations are entitled to First Amendment speech protection
and that an originalist would have to consult historical context to determine
whether that was so.  As to the First Amendment, one of the first originalists,
Robert Bork, wrote that “[t]he framers seem to have had no coherent theory
of free speech and appear not to have been overly concerned with the sub-
ject.”11  As a result, “[w]e are . . . forced to construct our own theory of the
constitutional protection of speech.  We cannot solve our problems simply by
reference to the text or to its history.”12  The text of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also provides no suggestion at all that corporations were considered
“persons” for purposes of the Amendment.
When the historical public understanding of the First Amendment is
considered, the originalist foundations of Citizens United begin to quiver.  As
of the Founding, there were no business corporations operating under so-
called general corporation statutes.13  Rather, the only extant business corpo-
rations were specifically created by legislatures with detailed charters that
their managers were obligated to follow with fidelity.  The ultra vires doctrine
forced corporations to strictly adhere to the powers, activities, and ends
detailed in their charters.  Someone with a much closer view to the historical
context than any current Supreme Court Justice,14 the Chief Justice of the
United States in 1819, wrote in his decision in the Dartmouth College case that
“[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
10 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (collecting cases applying the First
Amendment to corporations).
11 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22
(1971).
12 Id.
13 Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A Continuation of Willard
Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 84 (1999).
14 When interpreting ambiguous constitutional text, we consider it a responsible act of
modesty to give weight to the views of those closer in time to the text’s adoption. Cf. Frank
Easterbrook, Foreword, in ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW, at xxv (2012)
(“Words don’t have intrinsic meanings; the significance of an expression depends on how
the interpretive community alive at the time of the text’s adoption understood those
words.  The older the text, the more distant that interpretive community from our own.  At
some point the difference becomes so great that the meaning is no longer recoverable
reliably.”).
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expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”15  As an originalist matter,
therefore, it was impossible for the First Amendment to generally accord bus-
iness corporations broad expressive rights because the understanding at the
time was that corporations only had the rights specifically granted in their
charters, and that corporations were not in any way persons like actual
human beings.  In fact, corporations had the opposite relationship to society
as human beings in the Lockean-Jeffersonian sense, in that rather than pos-
sessing inalienable rights that society could not take away, corporations had
only such rights as society explicitly gave them.
Likewise, as of the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
there was no weakening of the accepted notion that corporations only had
such rights as were specifically granted to them by the government that
chartered them, and that they were subject to substantial governmental
restriction.16  Although by that time, corporations had become more com-
mon and general corporation statutes had emerged allowing private citizens
to form corporations consistent with the broader enabling nature of those
statutes, the ultra vires doctrine (albeit somewhat weakened) remained the
prevailing rule.17  Most important, legislatures that had moved to adopt gen-
eral corporation statutes did so on the assumption that they reserved the
power to restrict corporations from engaging in conduct inconsistent with
the public interest.18  That is, corporations remained creatures of the state in
the sense that they were granted a legal existence on the condition that they
operate within the constraints imposed upon them by society.  And as inter-
nal corporate law constraints weakened, other external sources of law
emerged to address the influence of corporations, including laws restricting
their involvement in the political process.  Thus, the idea that corporations
were entitled to be considered as persons with constitutional rights co-exten-
sive with those of actual individuals would have been inconsistent with the
understanding of the relationship between the government and the corpora-
tion as of 1868.  Even after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the con-
stitutional protections granted to corporations in judicial decisions were
limited to property rights closely related to a corporation’s ability to conduct
its business and preserve its assets.19
15 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.).
16 See, e.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 162 (1970).
17 Id. at 69.
18 Id. at 56.
19 Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 1, at 5 (“The courts have always exhibited a willing-
ness to protect the constitutional rights of the natural persons who joined corporations,
but the extent to which a corporate entity could claim Fourteenth-Amendment protections
on behalf of its members depended on the nature of their stakes.  In the case of business
corporations, these stakes have historically been limited to property rights.”); see also Mar-
garet M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1686–96 (2015).
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Thus, we conclude that however Citizens United is rationalized, it cannot
be defended solely or primarily as the product of a disciplined application of
the originalist method of constitutional interpretation.  Because Citizens
United takes a view at odds both with the historical understanding of business
corporations’ legal subordination to the decisions made by elected legislators
and the lengthy history of federal and state legislation restricting the involve-
ment of for-profit corporations in the political process, it can be fairly
described as more “original” than originalist.
I. ORIGINALISM AND CITIZENS UNITED
A. Originalism
There are many varieties of originalism, but most originalist theories can
be divided into two broad categories: those that seek the original intention
behind the Constitution or those that attempt to determine the original pub-
lic understanding of the Constitution’s meaning.20  Of these two, original
intent is the older theory, and it was popularized by Raoul Berger and Robert
Bork.21  Those who base their originalism on original intent try to discern
the intention of “those actors whose decisions produced the constitutional
language whose meaning is at issue: the framers at the Federal Convention or
the members of the First Federal Congress (or subsequent congresses) who
drafted later amendments.”22  This approach has been criticized23 and
arguably would have been unrecognizable to the Founders themselves, who
would have been more familiar with textualist than intentionalist methods of
interpretation.24
The more current variant of originalism—which Randy Barnett has pop-
ularized as the “New Originalism”—looks to the original understanding of
the framers’ text.25  This form of originalism, to which Robert Bork later
converted, can also be termed a theory of “intent,” although it is an objective
theory of intent.26  Relevant to our purposes now, Justice Scalia subscribes to
this theory of original understanding, or original objective intent: he has
stated that judges should look for “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent
20 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 7–9 (1997).
21 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 402–27 (2d ed. 1997); Bork, supra note 11, at 13 (“The words [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] are general but surely that would not permit us to escape the
framers’ intent if it were clear.”).
22 RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 8.
23 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980).
24 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 339–65 (describing Madison’s inconsistent use of
originalism).
25 Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999).
26 See Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411,
412–15 (2014); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990).
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that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law.”27  In other
words, “the meaning which the subject is authorized to understand the legis-
lature intended.”28
Justice Scalia is, in his own words, a “textualist-originalist.”29  That means
that Justice Scalia is committed to determining the meaning of a law from the
text: when the text of a statute is clear, a judge may not go beyond it or twist
its meaning to reach his or her desired result.30  If the text is unclear, a judge
may employ canons of construction.  Thus, for example, if a judge is faced
with a statute containing a list of definite items and the phrase “other things”
at the end, the “other things” are taken to be of the same kind as the definite
items.31
Constitutional text presents a “distinctive problem” for Justice Scalia
because the form of the text is different from that of a statute.32  “In textual
interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells
us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expan-
sive rather than narrow interpretation—though not an interpretation that
the language will not bear.”33  To interpret the open-ended text of the Con-
stitution, Justice Scalia looks to evidence of “how the text of the Constitution
was originally understood.”34  When it comes to the Bill of Rights, Justice
Scalia may look to the “writings . . . of . . . intelligent and informed people of
the time.”35  Justice Scalia does not look to the Framers’ intent, as Bork and
Berger did, but to the meaning of the text as it was originally understood.36
This understanding of the text must, by definition, be rooted in the text
itself.  Therefore, when the text is unambiguous, there is no need for any
historical inquiry.  We do not need any interpretation of the Age Clause of
Article II, Section 1, which provides that the President must be at least thirty-
five years old.37  Nor should we need any evidence to tell us how to interpret
the Third Amendment’s proscription against quartering soldiers in houses
during peacetime without the owner’s consent.38  We look to the text first;
and if it is clear, that is the end of the matter.39
27 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1997).
28 Id. (emphasis omitted).
29 Id. at 132.
30 See, e.g., id. at 18–23 (discussing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892)).
31 Id. at 26; see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 199–213 (discussing ejusdem
generis); infra note 106 (same).
32 SCALIA, supra note 27, at 37.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 38.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
38 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see SCALIA, supra note 27, at 134.
39 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“I argue for the role of tradition in giving content only to ambiguous constitutional
text; no tradition can supersede the Constitution.”).
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If the text is unclear, though, we can then look to contemporaneous
sources to determine the original understanding of the text.40  Justice
Scalia’s constitutional interpretation is thus analogous to the two-step process
that courts employ when deciding whether to defer to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of a statute under Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil41—a case with which he agrees.42  First, the court decides if the text is
unclear.  If the text is clear, that ends the inquiry, just as in Chevron.43  If the
text is ambiguous, Justice Scalia (and a court applying Chevron) continues.  A
court reviewing an administrative decision will consider whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable;44 Justice Scalia will seek a reasonable original
understanding of the text.
The qualifier “reasonable” is important.  Justice Scalia admits that a rigid
adherence to original understandings in this second step may be “medicine
that seems too strong to swallow.”45  He therefore dilutes it with various
devices.  One is an adherence to stare decisis.  Scalia may go along with past
decisions that he thinks are inconsistent with the original understanding, but
calls this a “pragmatic exception” to originalism.46  Justice Scalia does not
confine himself to sources from the time of the text’s adoption, but will also
rely on “traditions,” however defined.47
One obvious challenge for an originalist judge is analyzing the evidence
to determine the answer to a difficult historical question, when the more
suited person for the task would be not a jurist but a professional historian,
untroubled by the time pressure of publishing a judicial opinion.48  But,
according to Justice Scalia,
While it may indeed be unrealistic to have substantial confidence that judges
and lawyers will find the correct historical answer to such refined questions
of original intent as the precise content of ‘the executive Power’ [in Article
II, Section 1], for the vast majority of questions the answer is clear.49
We are not trying to praise or criticize Justice Scalia’s method of original-
ism.  We are simply attempting to set it out as clearly as possible so that we
40 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at 78–92.
41 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
42 See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872–73 (2013); United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
44 Id. at 843–44.
45 Scalia, supra note 37, at 861.
46 SCALIA, supra note 27, at 140 (emphasis omitted).
47 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 609 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
48 Scalia, supra note 37, at 860–61; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
803–04 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Historical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes
requires resolving threshold questions, and making nuanced judgments about which evi-
dence to consult and how to interpret it.  I will stipulate to that.”).
49 Scalia, supra note 37, at 863.
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can judge the originalist concurrence in Citizens United against the methodol-
ogy it purports to employ.50  We now look at the concurrence in detail.
B. The Scalia-Stevens Debate About Whether the Result
Can Be Defended as Originalism
In its ruling, the Citizens United majority deviated from the doctrine of
stare decisis by overturning its recent decision in McConnell v. FEC, in which
McCain-Feingold’s restrictions on corporate and labor political activities had
been found constitutional.51  The McCain-Feingold Act made it unlawful for
“any corporation . . . or any labor organization [ ] to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any [federal] election.”52  Contributions and
expenditures were defined to include any payment for an “electioneering
communication,”53 which included advertisements referring to a “clearly
identified candidate for Federal office” within sixty days of a general election
and thirty days of a primary.54  These restrictions did not, however, prevent
corporations and unions from forming political action committees to help
employees, stockholders, and members pool their funds in support of candi-
dates.55  The Court upheld these restrictions as constitutional in McConnell.56
In Citizens United, the Court changed course and held that McCain-Fein-
gold’s restriction on expenditures by corporations and unions on election-
eering communications was unconstitutional.57  Justice Scalia, joined by
Justices Alito and Thomas, wrote a concurrence that advanced an originalist
theory why corporations should be able to make unlimited corporate
expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of political
candidates.58
Justice Scalia wrote his concurrence to rebut Justice Stevens’s own histor-
ical exposition, which argued that corporations had no right at the time of
the framing of the Constitution to engage in political speech.59  Justice Ste-
vens pointed out that, to the extent that it was possible to discern the inten-
tions of the Framers of the Constitution and that these intentions were
relevant to the case, they tended to undermine the majority’s position.60  Jus-
tice Stevens observed that corporations were rare before the ratification of
50 Talented thinkers have criticized it, of course. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Inco-
herence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/arti
cle/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism; see
also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 182 (2013).
51 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
52 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006).
53 Id. § 441b(b)(2).
54 Id. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i).
55 See id. § 441b(b)(2).
56 540 U.S. at 189–94.
57 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).
58 Id. at 385–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 425–32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60 Id. at 426–27.
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the First Amendment in 1791, and those few that existed owed their exis-
tence to special legislative charters.61  These special charters enumerated the
activities that the corporation could engage in.  Moreover, a corporation
could only obtain a charter if its activities would be “consistent with public
welfare.”62
Thus, according to Justice Stevens, the framers “took it as a given that
corporations could be comprehensively regulated in the service of the public
welfare.”63  And this dovetailed with the original understanding of the First
Amendment: “Unlike our colleagues, they had little trouble distinguishing
corporations from human beings, and when they constitutionalized the right
to free speech in the First Amendment, it was the free speech of individual
Americans that they had in mind.”64  Therefore, there was no conflict
between a state’s right to regulate its corporations and the speech rights
guaranteed to Americans by the First Amendment.
Justice Scalia disputed this evidence.  He argued that there was no basis
to limit corporate political speech on the ground that corporations, at the
time of the framing, were only permitted to engage in limited activities spe-
cifically authorized by their charters.65  Justice Scalia appeared to presume
that corporations did have political speech rights in 1791, and asserted that
there was “no evidence,” “none whatever,” that the protections of the First
Amendment did not extend to corporations.66  He claimed that, at the time
of the ratification of the Bill of Rights, no distinction was drawn between
corporations and natural persons for the purposes of speech rights, and so
corporations could not be excluded from the coverage of the First Amend-
ment.  Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens’s contention that the First
Amendment protected only the individual rights of Americans by noting that
it was correct that the First Amendment was designed to protect the “rights of
individual men and women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears.  But
the individual person’s right to speak includes the right to speak in association
with other individual persons.”67  Therefore, he wrote, if we interpret the First
Amendment in accordance with its “original meaning,” it cannot be con-
strued to prevent corporations from being involved in the electoral
process.68
For much of his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that there was no
evidence that the government had the right to regulate the speech of for-
profit corporations.  That is clearly a resort to step two of the originalist
inquiry, as we have described it in Section I.A above.  But Justice Scalia’s con-
61 Id.
62 Id. at 427 (quoting RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COR-
PORATION, 1784–1855, at 5 (1982)).
63 Id. at 428.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 385–93 (Scalia, J., concurring).
66 Id. at 389.
67 Id. at 391–92.
68 Id. at 393.
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currence also argues repeatedly that the text is unambiguous—and so we
should not begin a historical inquiry.  Justice Scalia points out that the “con-
stitutional text . . . makes no distinction between types of speakers”69 and that
there is no “textual exception for speech by corporations.”70  Rather, the
First Amendment’s text is “unqualified”71 and “[i]ts text offers no foothold
for excluding any category of speaker.”72  All that matters is that Congress
may not regulate speech.73
This should be enough, one might think, to cut off the Chevron-style
originalism inquiry at step one: if the constitutional text is clear and unam-
biguous, no additional analysis is required—or allowed.  But this cannot be
true.  For a start, as Justice Scalia acknowledges, the Bill of Rights only pro-
tects “the rights of individual men and women—not, for example, of trees
and polar bears.”74  The First Amendment speaks to the abridgment of the
“freedom of speech,” and not to whether that freedom extended to artificial
entities that at the time were rare and specifically chartered to serve specific
purposes.  A business corporation is not simply “individual men and women”:
it is a distinct entity that is legally separate from its stockholders, managers,
and creditors.  This is the whole point of corporate law after all,75 and one
that Justice Scalia implicitly acknowledges in his concurrence.76  Justice
Scalia has also candidly noted that for-profit corporations do not have the
objective of expressing opinions by stating that “[t]he Campbell Soup Com-
pany does not exist to promote a message.”77  Therefore Justice Scalia must
69 Id. at 386.
70 Id. at 388.
71 Id. at 389.
72 Id. at 392–93.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 391–92.
75 See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 73 (2010) (“The cor-
poration has been regarded from its inception as a legal entity distinct from its owners.”).
76 To contend that a corporation is the owner of its equity is to reject corporation law
itself.  Corporations have perpetual existence, are not owned by anyone (stockholders own
shares with certain legal rights, not pieces of the corporation), and have a separate legal
existence from the stockholders, managers, and creditors. See ROBERT STEPHEN M. BAIN-
BRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 2 (2d ed. 2009) (“[T]he corporation is an entity wholly separate
from the people who own it and work for it.”); CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.2.3, at
15–21 (1986); 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPO-
RATIONS § 5709 (rev. vol. 2015) (“[A] corporation is an entity distinct from its sharehold-
ers . . . .”).  Justice Scalia concedes that “corporations [can] pursue only the objectives set
forth in their charters,” whereas, of course, individuals may pursue whatever legal goals
they like. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 386 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Below, we discuss further problems with Justice Scalia’s view that corporations are
merely a vehicle for the “individuals” that “associat[e]” to form them. See infra note 166
and accompanying text.  Indeed, it is a stretch to say the modern corporation is an associa-
tion of individuals, given that most corporate stock is held by institutional investors. See
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907, 1922
(2013).
77 Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 467 (2008)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 12  4-APR-16 13:24
888 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
resort to the second step of the originalist inquiry to determine whether it
was understood at the time of the Founding that Congress could restrict cor-
porations’ speech rights.
Furthermore, it seems unreasonable to ascribe to Justice Scalia the view
that speech in and of itself is all that matters, because under well-settled First
Amendment doctrine, there are numerous exceptions to speech rights that
depend on the type of speech78 and the identity of the speaker.79  Justice
Scalia has authored opinions arguing that the government may restrict
speech based on the identity of the speaker.80  By way of pertinent example,
Scalia has been unwilling to accord the same speech rights to labor unions as
he contends corporations possess.81  And Justice Scalia himself has admitted
in his extrajudicial writing that applying the First Amendment to modern
contexts, such as television, “is not entirely cut-and-dried but requires the
exercise of judgment.”82  Therefore, we do not ascribe to Justice Scalia the
view that the First Amendment is clear on its face as a textual matter as to the
78 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(holding that speech of ideas belonging to others is unprotected); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscene speech is unprotected); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that fighting words are unprotected).
79 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 420 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing constitutional
restraints that the government puts on the speech rights of students, prisoners, foreigners,
and its own employees).
80 E.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686–711 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that the government should be permitted to retaliate against a contrac-
tor on the basis of that contractor’s political speech); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497
U.S. 62, 92–115 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that it should be constitutional for
a government employer to reject an applicant on the basis of his or her political speech);
David Schultz, Justice Antonin Scalia’s First Amendment Jurisprudence: Free Speech, Press and Asso-
ciation Decisions, 9 J.L. & POL. 515, 519 (1993) (“[W]hile [his] participation in certain high
profile decisions striking down flag burning or cross burning laws as unconstitutional have
given him a reputation as a defender of free speech, press and association, he is not.  In
the forty-six identified cases involving these freedoms, he has voted against them thirty-
three times.”).
81 In Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012),
the Court ruled that labor unions were not permitted to require nonmembers to pay fees
to fight a referendum.  By parity of reasoning to Citizens United, labor unions should get to
use treasury funds on the same basis as corporate boards.  Strine & Walter, supra note 1, at
365–67 (discussing the restrictions placed on union dues by Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977)).  If the reasoning of Abood were applied to corporations, as it more
than plausibly could, corporations could not use treasury funds for political purposes and
could only use funds specifically raised from stockholders for those purposes, consistent
with the design of McCain-Feingold.
82 SCALIA, supra note 27, at 45.  Indeed, one thing that originalists of all stripes tend to
agree on is that the First Amendment is resistant to historical inquiry.  Bork, supra note 11,
at 22; accord BALKIN, supra note 7, at 265 (“History gives us relatively little help in determin-
ing what principle or principles underlie the words ‘freedom of speech.’”).
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question of whether it accords any rights to corporations, much less whether
those rights are identical to those it grants to humans.83
II. AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZENS UNITED ACCORDING TO
JUSTICE SCALIA’S ORIGINALISM
We now embark on our own, historical inquiry to determine who got the
better of this debate.  Before we do so, however, we must say a few more
words about our method of originalism.  We will hew to Justice Scalia’s
approach: we do not claim that the text of the First Amendment alone
resolves this issue, and therefore we will look to historical practice.  But we
must consider the relevant time period for our inquiry.  We will first look at
the understanding of the First Amendment at the time that it was adopted by
Congress.  The debate between Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens focused on
the meaning of the First Amendment in 1789–91; and there would not have
been any reason for them to look at any other point in time, because they
were debating the constitutionality of a federal law in Citizens United.
But the First Amendment, like most other provisions of the Bill of
Rights, has since been incorporated against the states after the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment.84  And the reasoning in Citizens United has been
extended to invalidate state restrictions on corporate political spending.85
Because the First Amendment was incorporated against the states via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it may be argued that the
relevant time period for analyzing state restrictions on corporate political
spending is not 1789–91, but 1866–68.  As important, the Fourteenth
Amendment could have been intended to broaden the category of legally
recognized persons who could exercise rights granted in the Bill of Rights.
That is, we also consider whether the Fourteenth Amendment was under-
stood as putting corporations on the same footing as human beings in terms
of possessing enforceable constitutional rights.
Thus, like some scholars, we analyze the relevant questions of publicly
understood meaning at both relevant time periods.86  In Part IV, we discuss
83 Such a view would also be inconsistent with his nonjudicial writings. See, e.g.,
SCALIA, supra note 27, at 37–38 (observing that the First Amendment must be construed to
protect handwritten letters, even though they are not speech or press).  It would also be in
tension with his judicial opinions on who has standing to sue to assert a right in federal
court. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J.
1141 (1993) (discussing Justice Scalia’s limited view of standing).
84 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925).
85 See Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
86 One author who has studied the original understanding of corporations’ political
speech rights has written that “[o]f course, for an originalist, delineating the proper scope
of state restrictions on corporate speech would have to take into account the views of the
generation that drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Speir, supra note 1, at
179.  Others agree. See David Bernstein, Incorporation, Originalism, and the Confrontation
Clause, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 6, 2009, 10:14 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/12469328
56.shtml (“When a right protected by the Bill of Rights is applied to the states via the 14th
Amendment, it has to be the 1868 understanding of that right, not the 1791 understand-
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whether the First Amendment gave corporations the speech rights guaran-
teed to natural persons.  Finding that the text of the Amendment does not
answer this question, we examine the historical treatment of corporations
before 1800 and find that there is no evidence that corporations were permit-
ted to act on the political process without restriction.  Rather, the evidence is
that the sovereign that chartered a corporation could exercise tight control
over it.  In Part V, we discuss the development of the rights of corporations
between 1800 and the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We find
that nothing in this period changed the existing conception of the corpora-
tion: the corporation had limited rights protecting its property, but no rights
that could not be described as necessary or incidental to its existence.  In Part
VI, we discuss the Fourteenth Amendment and developments in corporate
law after 1868.  Again, we first look to the text of the Amendment, and find
that there is nothing in the text that can be read as granting corporations the
right of a natural person to speak generally, and more specifically the right to
spend money in the political process.  Having found the text to be silent, we
examine legal developments in the fifty years following 1868.  Although cor-
porate law doctrines changed during this period, we find nothing that leads
us to conclude that, as a historical matter, a corporation was considered as of
the time of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free to
engage in political speech with treasury funds on the same basis as a human
person; much less that the government could not restrict the means by which
corporations could do so, along the lines that McCain-Feingold did.
Thus, no matter what period is used, an originalist interpretation of the
First Amendment cannot justify the holding in Citizens United.  In fact, the
strong weight of the historical evidence would support the notion that gov-
ernment could impose restrictions on corporate political spending that it
could not impose on human beings.
III. THE UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATIONS AS OF THE ADOPTION
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Corporations Are the Opposite of Lockean-Jeffersonian Human Beings
Determining whether the public at the time of the Founding viewed cor-
porations as having rights coextensive with individual citizens is not hard,
because the historical record is clear that it would have been alien to any of
ing, that governs.”); see also Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed:
Privileges or Immunities, The Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 51–54 (2010) (endorsing Bernstein’s
theory).  Akhil Amar relies on the meaning of rights in 1868 in his work. E.g., AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 322–27 (2005) (comparing the understand-
ing of the Second Amendment in 1789 to 1866); see Sunstein, supra note 7 (Amar’s work
has some features of originalism).
Justice Scalia, by contrast, focuses on colonial and early state practices even when
interpreting provisions of the Bill of Rights applied to the States. See, e.g., Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–50 (2004).  We do not take sides in this debate.
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the Founders or their fellow Americans for anyone to assert that any corpora-
tion had any right to do anything that it was not specifically authorized to do
by a specific act of the legislature.  Just as it was self-evident that “all Men . . .
[were] endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” such as
“Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness,” it was self-evident that all corpo-
rations were endowed by their creator—the chartering authority, such as the
state legislature—only with those rights that their creators saw fit to give.87
As we discuss, corporations existed only if a legislature created them and they
were empowered to do only that which the legislature said they could do.
In other words, it was widely understood that human beings and corpo-
rations had precisely the opposite relationship to society in terms of rights.88
Human beings were born with inalienable rights that government could not
take away; corporations had only such rights as the government chose to give
to them.  Even though the law identified a corporation with its flesh-and-
blood owners for some limited purposes, the rights given to for-profit com-
mercial corporations did not include the right to speak as a flesh-and-blood
citizen.
B. Corporations in England and Colonial North America
The first corporations chartered in Europe in the Middle Ages were not
business corporations.  Rather, they were religious, municipal, and benevo-
lent corporations.89  Typical among the earliest corporations is the alms-
house and school in the Sutton’s Hospital case, which was decided in England
in 1613 and was of major significance in the later law of corporations.90  In
June 1611, James I granted letters patent to Thomas Sutton permitting him
to found a hospital in London.91  Sutton died shortly afterward and left prop-
erty to the hospital in his will.92  But Sutton had not founded the hospital by
the time of his death, so his human heirs challenged the bequest: How could
an entity that did not exist inherit property?93  To this, Edward Coke, then
Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, replied that a corporation named in a
charter could receive property even before it began operating, because, by
definition, a corporation was a legal construct:
And it is great reason that an hospital, &c. in expectancy or intendment, or
nomination, should be sufficient to support the name of an incorporation
when the corporation itself is only in abstracto, and rests only in intendment
87 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
88 See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W.
VA. L. REV. 173, 184 (1985) (“The corporation . . . stood in clear contradiction to a legal
culture dominated by Lockean ideas of pre-social natural rights.”).
89 HURST, supra note 16, at 2–3.
90 The Case of Sutton’s Hosp., (1613) 77 Eng. Rep. 937 (K.B.); 10 Co. Rep. 1a.
91 Id. at 961; 10 Co. Rep. at 23a–b.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 961–62; 10 Co. Rep. at 23b–24a.
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and consideration of the law; for a corporation aggregate of many is invisible,
immortal, and rests only in intendment and consideration of the law . . . .94
This holding is relevant to our present inquiry.  Because corporations
were legal constructs, Coke said, they did not possess human capabilities:
They cannot commit treason, nor be . . . outlawed, nor excommunicate, for
they have no souls, neither can they appear in person, but by attorney.  A
corporation aggregate of many cannot do fealty, for an invisible body can
neither be in person, nor swear, it is not subject to imbecilities, death of the
natural body, and divers other cases.95
Corporations did, however, possess certain other attributes, “tacit[ly]
annexed” to them, without which they would be of little utility.96  Because
these attributes were “tacit[ ],” they did not need to be spelled out in the
charter.  Thus, “corporation is sufficient without the words to implead and to
be impleaded, &c. and therefore divers clauses subsequent in the charters are
not of necessity, but only declaratory, and might well have been left out.”97  It was not
necessary that the charter recite that the corporation could receive and sell
property; this was “incident” to the corporation’s existence.98  As we shall see,
Coke’s conception of the corporation—an entity with certain legal rights that
would enable it to perform its function, but with no human characteristics
such as the ability to commit treason—held sway in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries.
Business corporations first appeared in England in the late sixteenth
century in the form of foreign trading ventures.99  But they were not com-
mon in England, and were still less common in the American colonies.100  All
94 Id. at 973; 10 Co. Rep. at 32b (emphasis added).
95 Id. (citations omitted).
96 Id. at 970; 10 Co. Rep. at 30b.
97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 Id.  Coke suggested that the charter might ideally spell out the corporation’s legal
attributes “to oust doubts and questions which might arise,” but little was formally required
in the charter. Id.  The requirements were: (1) “[l]awful authority of incorporation,” such
as Parliament or the King; (2) the “persons to be incorporated”; (3) a name; and (4) a
place. Id. at 968–69; 10 Co. Rep. at 29b.  The charter should include “every thing which is
of the essence of the incorporation,” but certain attributes of the corporate form, such as
“to implead and to be impleaded, to grant and purchase, &c. are incidents to a body incor-
porate.” Id.
99 HURST, supra note 16, at 4; see, e.g., Liam Se´amus O’Melinn, Neither Contract nor
Concession: The Public Personality of the Corporation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 201, 217–18 (2006)
(observing that before 1811, there were no general incorporation statutes pertaining to
business organizations, but only for churches, charitable societies, literary societies, and
libraries).
100 HURST, supra note 16, at 7 (“[N]o evidence of significant demand for corporate
charters for local enterprise until about 1780 . . . .”).  Samuel Williston identifies only six
“joint-stock business corporations chartered in America before 1787.”  Samuel Williston,
History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 149, 166 (1888). Only
one of those on Williston’s list predates 1776, the Philadelphia Contributionship for the
Insuring of Houses from Loss by Fire, which was chartered by Pennsylvania in 1768. Id. at
165.  Simeon Baldwin identifies six business corporations chartered during the colonial
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these corporations were created through special charters.  In the colonies,
the power to issue charters was split between the governor, the colonial legis-
lature, and the proprietor in proprietary colonies.101
William Blackstone, whose influence on Founding-era lawmakers and
jurists has been well documented, devoted a section of his Commentaries to
corporations.102  In Blackstone’s view, corporations were created “for the
advantage of the public”: their chief benefit was that they had perpetual
life.103  The king’s consent was required for any act of incorporation: the
king could create corporations himself or, if Parliament exercised its author-
ity to create a corporation, the king could veto Parliament’s act.104
Like Coke, Blackstone noted that a corporation held some rights, in
addition to those expressly set out in its charter, as “incidents . . . tacitly
annexed of course.”105  These rights included “[t]o sue or be sued, implead
or be impleaded, grant or receive, by [its] corporate name.”106  But, also like
Coke, Blackstone noted that corporations did not have the full rights of natu-
ral persons: they could not commit treason, or act as a trustee, or appear in
era: the New York Company “for Settleing a Fishery in these parts,” of 1675; the Free Soci-
ety of Traders, chartered by Pennsylvania in 1682; the New London Society United for
Trade and Commerce (Connecticut 1732); the Union Wharf Company (Connecticut
1760); the Philadelphia Contributionship, cited by Williston; and the Long Wharf in Bos-
ton, chartered in 1772.  Simeon E. Baldwin, American Business Corporations Before 1789, 8
AM. HIST. REV. 449, 450 (1903).  Lawrence Friedman, citing Joseph Davis, identifies seven
colonial business corporations. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 130
(3d ed. 2005) (citing 2 JOSEPH S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN COR-
PORATIONS 24 (1917)). But however early business corporations are defined, it is clear that
there were very few of them. See, e.g., McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland. 307, 418 (Md. Ch. 1828)
(“It is remarkable, that there is no instance of the creation of any body politic of this
description under the Provincial government [viz., the Province of Maryland].”).  The
dominant early form of business organization was the partnership. FRIEDMAN, supra, at
130.
101 HURST, supra note 16, at 14, 115.
102 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *455–73; see Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscover-
ing Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
103 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 102, at *455.
104 Id. at *461–62.
105 Id. at *463.
106 Id. This sentence ends “and do all other acts as natural persons may.”  Given the
differences that Blackstone acknowledged between corporations and natural persons, it is
obvious that Blackstone did not mean that corporations had all the rights of natural per-
sons.  Rather, by his phrase “sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or receive, by
[its] corporate name, and do all other acts as natural persons may,” Blackstone expects us
to interpret his words with the help of the ejusdem generis canon: “[w]here general words
follow an enumeration of two or more things, they apply only to persons or things of the
same general kind or class specifically mentioned.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 14, at
199.  Thus, Justice Scalia would, we assume, interpret the phrase “all other acts as natural
persons may” to include only such other acts similar to those previously listed—for exam-
ple, to lease property.  It would be inconsistent with canons of construction to interpret
this phrase as including, for example, the right to give money to a natural person’s parlia-
mentary campaign.
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court.107  Blackstone spoke little about commercial corporations as opposed
to municipal or religious corporations.  But to the extent that he discussed
business corporations, he made clear that they had fewer rights than other
corporations.  According to Blackstone, each corporation had “inseparably
incident” to itself the power to make its own bylaws, “[b]ut no trading com-
pany is, with us, allowed to make bye-laws, which may affect the king’s prerog-
ative, or the common profit of the people, unless they be approved by the
chancellor, treasurer, and chief justices, or the judges of assise in their cir-
cuits.”108  Thus, the rights of business corporations were even more circum-
scribed than those of other corporations.
C. Corporations in North America at the Time of the Founding
After the American Revolution, the power to create corporations was
vested in state legislatures.109  Although the corporate form grew in popular-
ity after independence, corporations remained creatures of special stat-
utes.110  There were no general incorporation acts at this time, like the acts
under which corporations are chartered today.111  These acts only became
common in the two decades before the Civil War.112  Instead, at the time of
the Founding, it was necessary to obtain a charter from the legislature for a
particular entity.113
The lack of general incorporation statutes for businesses reflects a gen-
eral mistrust in the Founding era of the corporate form, and business corpo-
rations in particular.  Thomas Jefferson hoped that the new country could
“crush in [its] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare
already to challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance
to the laws of our country.”114  James Madison wrote that “[i]ncorporated
Companies with proper limitations and guards, may in particular cases, be
useful; but they are at best a necessary evil only.”115  James Wilson warned: “It
must be admitted . . . that, in too many instances, those bodies politick [i.e.,
corporations] have, in their progress, counteracted the design of their origi-
nal formation. . . . [T]hey should be erected with caution, and inspected with
107 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 102, at *464.
108 Id.  From an originalist perspective, this restriction has a modern-day relevance: if,
for example, a corporation passed a bylaw empowering an officer to give money to support
a candidate in a parliamentary election, this bylaw could be invalidated on the ground that
it was not in the public interest.
109 HURST, supra note 16, at 14.
110 Three-hundred and seventeen business corporations were chartered between 1780
and 1801, compared to only a handful before independence. Id. at 14.
111 O’Melinn, supra note 99, at 216.
112 See Hamill, supra note 13, at 97–102.
113 O’Melinn, supra note 99, at 216.
114 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to George Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 12 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 44 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905), cited in Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310, 427 n.54 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 James Madison, Letter to James K. Paulding (Mar. 10, 1827), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 281, 281 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
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care.”116  At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers rejected Madison’s
proposal that Congress should be permitted to issue charters to corporations
“in cases where the Public good may require them, and the authority of a
single State may be incompetent.”117  It was generally assumed that the
power to charter these potentially dangerous entities was to be limited to the
states—whereby the corporations would be weaker, and easier to regulate.118
116 James Wilson, Of Corporations, in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1035, 1035
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
117 Hamill, supra note 13, at 90 (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 325 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)).
118 Hamill, supra note 13, at 89.  States retained complete control over corporations,
because a state retained power over all corporations chartered by itself as well as corpora-
tions chartered by other states operating within its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 590 (1839) (a state had the power to pass legislation preventing a for-
eign bank from making contracts in its territory); see also Hooper v. California, 155 U.S.
648, 652 (1895) (“[T]he right of a foreign corporation to engage in business within a State
other than that of its creation, depends solely upon the will of such other State, has been
long settled . . . .”); George W. Wickersham, State Control of Foreign Corporations, 19 YALE L.J.
1, 4–5 (1909) (discussing states’ near-plenary power to regulate foreign corporations).
Mistrust of corporations survived well beyond the lifetime of the Founding Fathers.  In
1832, Andrew Jackson vetoed the renewal of the charter of the Second Bank of the United
States on the ground that it was an unconstitutional monopoly serving the interests of the
rich, and urged that “we . . . take a stand against all new grants of monopolies and exclusive
privileges.”  Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1817–1833, at 576 (regarding the Bank of the United States).  In
his Farewell Address in 1837, he again warned against the social harm that could be caused
by corporate wealth:
The agricultural, the mechanical, and the laboring classes have little or no share
in the direction of the great moneyed corporations, and from their habits and the
nature of their pursuits they are incapable of forming extensive combinations to
act together with united force. . . .  [W]ith overwhelming numbers and wealth on
their side they are in constant danger of losing their fair influence in the Govern-
ment, and with difficulty maintain their just rights against the incessant efforts
daily made to encroach upon them.  The mischief springs from the power which
the moneyed interest derives . . . from the multitude of corporations with exclu-
sive privileges which they have succeeded in obtaining in the different States, and
which are employed altogether for their benefit; and unless you become more
watchful in your States and check this spirit of monopoly and thirst for exclusive
privileges you will in the end find that the most important powers of Government
have been given or bartered away, and the control over your dearest interests has
passed into the hands of these corporations.
Andrew Jackson, Farewell Address (Mar. 4, 1837), reprinted in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS, 1833–1841, at 292, 305–06. .  That same year, Martin Van Buren, the new
President, declared in his first Address to Congress that he was “more than ever convinced
of the dangers to which the free and unbiased exercise of political opinion—the only sure
foundation and safeguard of republican government—would be exposed by any further
increase of the already overgrown influence of corporate authorities.”  Martin Van Buren,
First Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 5, 1837), http://millercenter.org/president/van
buren/speeches/speech-3589.
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And state politicians also worried about the power of corporations.  The
Pennsylvania Council of Censors wrote in 1784 that corporations were
“against the spirit and the policy of democracy” because they were capable of
“holding common estates of large value, and exercising the power of making
bye-laws.”119  The New York Council of Revision two years later held that cor-
porations were “destructive of that principle of equal liberty which should
subsist in every community.”120  James Sullivan, attorney general of Massa-
chusetts, wrote in 1802 that “[t]he creation of a great variety of corporate
interests . . . must have a direct tendency to weaken the power of govern-
ment.”121  These concerns, to some extent, reflected those of the most prom-
inent economist of the period, Adam Smith, who was hostile to corporations
because they tended toward monopoly power.122  In Smith’s view, the only
corporations that could be safely chartered were those that required a privi-
leged relationship with the chartering entity: domestic public service enter-
prises such as canals and schools, and insurance companies and banks.123
But to the extent that business corporations were seen as providing a
public service, they were chartered to operate with the protection of limited
liability.  Their numbers at the time of the revolution were few.  By 1787, less
than a dozen business corporations had been chartered in the colonies.124
But the corporate form grew in popularity as the new country required infra-
structure that could only be completed through the investment of capital:
turnpikes, bridges, canals, and plank roads.125  These infrastructure develop-
ments were seen as beneficial and thus states acted to charter corporations to
complete them.126  Insurance companies were also chartered because they
too were seen as performing a public service.127  Banks were also seen as
fulfilling a pressing public need and were granted special charters.128  The
last category of business association to be chartered in this period was manu-
facturing companies.  Like all of the previous categories, these were only
chartered to the extent that they were deemed useful to society.  Indeed, the
“pioneering” Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, which was incor-
119 Extract from the Minutes of the Council of Censors, PA. PACKET (Phila.), Sept. 7, 1784, at
2, quoted in Speir, supra note 1, at 127–28.
120 ALFRED BILLINGS STREET, THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
261–64 (Albany, William Gould 1859), quoted in Speir, supra note 1, at 128.
121 FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 134.
122 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 116–17 (P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776).
123 3 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 86–171 (P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776);
see also Ronald E. Seavoy, The Public Service Origins of the American Business Corporation, 52
BUS. HIST. REV. 30, 32 (1978) (endorsing Adam Smith’s view).
124 See supra note 100.
125 Seavoy, supra note 123, at 45.
126 Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights:
Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 959 (2014).
127 Seavoy, supra note 123, at 48.
128 Id. at 49.
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porated in New Jersey in 1791, advertised its public service function in its
name.129
The rights and powers of the few corporations that existed were limited
by statute.  In other words, corporations could do only what their legislatively
granted charters empowered them specifically to do, acts incidental to those
specific powers, and nothing else.130  For example, New York in 1790
chartered the New York Manufacturing Society to “establish[ ] manufacto-
ries, and furnish[ ] employment for the honest industrious poor.”131  The
directors had power to pass bylaws and regulations that were “needful and
proper” to the management of the corporation.132  But the special charter
was silent as to participation in the political process, or as to speech rights
more generally.  Similarly, there were ten other corporations that were spe-
cially chartered in the United States in 1790 and 1791.133  But nothing in the
charters of any of these corporations indicates they were permitted to involve
themselves in the electoral process, even though the charters set out the acts
that the corporations might undertake in extreme detail.134  Indeed, accord-
129 Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 126, at 986.
130 See, e.g., Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127, 167 (1804)
(“[A corporation] may correctly be said to be precisely what the incorporating act has
made it, to derive all its powers from that act, and to be capable of exerting its faculties only in the
manner which that act authorises.”) (Marshall, C.J.) (emphasis added).
131 An Act To Incorporate the Stockholders of the New-York Manufacturing Society
pmbl. (Mar. 16, 1790), reprinted in 2 THOMAS GREENLEAF, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK
309 (1792).
132 Id. § 4.
133 See Richard E. Sylla & Robert E. Wright, U.S. Corporate Development 1801–1860
(NSF Grant no. 0751577) (on file with authors).
134 For example, the Maryland legislature enacted in 1791 “[a]n Act to establish a bank
in Baltimore-town,” which specified the day of the week on which a committee of directors
would inspect the bank’s books and the procedure whereby the bank’s president would
recover on delinquent loans.  1790 Md. Laws ch. V, §§ VI, X, XIII.  The charter of the Bank
of New York forbade the bank to hold any more real estate than was “requisite for its
immediate accommodation, in relation to the convenient transacting of its business,” and
also provided that the bank could not “directly or indirectly, deal or trade, in buying or
selling, any goods, wares, merchandize or commodities whatsoever, or in buying or selling
any stock.”  1791 N.Y. Laws 237, 240.  The charter for the Providence Bank, which was
granted in 1791, provided for a minimum bond that cashiers and clerks must post.  1791
R.I. Pub. Laws 11, 1315.  Nothing in these precise charters explicitly granted the banks
power to contribute money to candidates for elected office or otherwise involve themselves
in the political process, and the narrow restraints placed on the banks suggests that the
banks would not have been seen to have this power.
The charters of canal companies were as precise as those of banks.  For example, the
Fayetteville Canal Company was incorporated in North Carolina in 1790.  The company
was authorized to “Make Cross Creek Navigable.”  The charter specified that the company
might build dams and locks and to “clear [the creek] from trees, logs and other such
things by which the said navigation might be obstructed.”  1790 N.C. Sess. Laws 98, 98.
The Pennsylvania legislature chartered the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Com-
pany in a thirteen-page special act of 1791, setting out in detail how the company might
obtain the land for the canal, construct it, and what rate of return it was to provide to its
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ing to one prominent nineteenth century treatise that we discuss, everything
that was not “incidental” to the corporation’s life was “illegal unless expressly
authorized by the charter.”135
The first Anglo-American treatise devoted to corporation law, Stewart
Kyd’s Treatise on the Law of Corporations, was published in London in 1793,
closer in time to the Founding than Blackstone and Coke.  Kyd’s treatise was
used by lawyers on both sides of the Atlantic.136  And Kyd, like Coke and
Blackstone before him, made clear that a corporation is a legal creation
entirely under the control of the authority that created it:
 A corporation . . . is a collection of many individuals, united into one
body, under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an
artificial form, and vested, by the policy of the law, with the capacity of act-
ing, in several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting
property, of contracting obligations, and of suing and being sued, of
enjoying privileges and immunities in common, and of exercising a variety
of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institu-
shareholders. 1790 Pa. Laws 150.  The charter of incorporation of the New-Meadow Canal
in Massachusetts was extremely brief—only five paragraphs—but it still regulated precisely
the tolls that the canal could charge and the process for awarding damages to those whose
land the canal crossed.  1791 Mass. Acts 110.  As in the case of banks, nothing grants the
canal companies power to spend money in support of candidates for elected office.
Some special charters were exercises of the state’s police powers.  In 1791, Maryland
enacted a statute establishing the Maryland Fire Insurance Company, which banned pri-
vate persons from holding more than thirty pounds of gunpowder in their homes.  1791
Md. Laws ch. 69, § XVII.  All gunpowder in excess of this amount had to be turned over to
the company, which would hold it in a magazine, and rates fixed in its charter. Id. ch. 69,
§§ XVIII, XXV.  But despite the company’s public service function and monopoly powers,
nothing in the charter explicitly or implicitly permitted it to become involved in politics.
The broadest and most elaborate charter about the time of the Founding was that of the
New Jersey Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures.  This covered technical matters of
corporate governance that remain of interest today (for example, whether directors could
repeal a bylaw enacted by the stockholders, cf. Bebchuk v. CA, Inc., 902 A.2d 737, 743 &
n.37 (Del. Ch. 2006)), but also granted the Society remarkable powers, such as the ability
to seize land through eminent domain to build canals and even incorporate a town, Pater-
son.  1791 N.J. Laws 720, 730.  And, unusually, the charter provided that its provisions
should be construed in the “most favorable Manner for the said respective Corporations,”
and that the Society could not forfeit its privileges through nonuser. Id. at 746.  But even
though the Society had broad powers for its time, its operations were closely regulated: the
Society was not permitted to “deal, nor trade, except in such Articles as itself [should]
manufacture” and the charter regulated even the kind of paint to be used to mark the
tonnage of the vessels using the canals. Id. at 731, 739.  In all of these detailed Founding-
era charters, no text suggests that corporations were permitted to involve themselves in the
political process by, for example, spending money on electoral campaigns.
135 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J.
1593, 1663 (1988) (citing J. ANGELL & S. AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPO-
RATIONS AGGREGATE ch. 6 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray, Little & Watkins 1832)).
136 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (London, J. Butterworth
1793).  For example, Kyd’s treatise was cited by the petitioners in Bank of United States v.
Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 64, 66 (1809).
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tion, or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation, or at any
subsequent period of its existence.137
Restrictions on corporations were so tight that “when corporations are
erected by act of parliament, for some particular purpose, it is frequently
thought prudent to prohibit them, by an express clause, from purchasing
lands beyond a certain annual value.”138  Such a prohibition even applied to
the East India Company, the most powerful business corporation in the
world at the time.139
The restraints on corporations in their charters mattered, because at this
time, the doctrines of ultra vires and quo warranto applied to corporations
with full force.  Under ultra vires, in the United States and England, all acts
that were not authorized by a company’s charter were null and void.140
Stockholders had the right to challenge ultra vires acts.141  An action under
quo warranto, on the other hand, could only be brought by the sovereign,
but it could lead to the dissolution of the corporation.142  “Quo warranto
actions against corporations for nonuser—refusal to undertake the invest-
ment and business for which the corporation was designed—were common
in the first half of the nineteenth century.”143  Thus, states retained full con-
trol over the corporations they chartered.
D. Corporations and the First Amendment
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech.”144  For reasons we have discussed, we do
137 KYD, supra note 136, at 13 (original emphasis omitted; new emphasis added).
138 Id. at 104.
139 Id.
140 Albert J. Harno, Privileges and Powers of a Corporation and the Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 35
YALE L.J. 13, 22 (1925).
141 Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at 1662–63.
142 Id. at 1659.
143 Id. at 1660 (emphasis added).  In America, an action by the sovereign to strip the
corporation of its charter for nonuser could also be maintained under scire facias.  For
example, in Washington & Baltimore Turnpike Co. v. Maryland, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 210 (1865),
the United States Supreme Court upheld the action of the State of Maryland in removing
the charter of a company operating a turnpike between Washington and Baltimore under
scire facias where the company had not kept the roads in repair, but still had demanded
tolls.  It was no defense to the scire facias action that the state had granted a charter to a
railroad company along the same route, and that the turnpike company could no longer
afford to maintain the road, because the turnpike company had not bargained for a
monopoly in its charter.  The Court held:
It might have been very proper for the State, when chartering the railroad, to
have provided for compensation for the prospective loss to the turnpike com-
pany, as has frequently been done in other States, under similar circumstances;
but this was a question resting entirely with the legislature of the State, and their
action is conclusive on the subject.
Id. at 213.
144 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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not ascribe to Justice Scalia the view that this language is clear on its face.145
Nor do we consider that the text clearly includes corporations within the
scope of the constitutional guarantee.146  Therefore, we have summarized
the evidence relating to the speech rights of business corporations at the
time of the Founding, and found that business corporations had no such
rights unless the legislature chose to grant them.
Justice Scalia’s contrary contention is premised on an assumption that
the Framers’ failure to state explicitly that corporations did not have equal
rights with human citizens reflected their tacit belief that corporations had
whatever rights human citizens were granted by the Constitution.  But as we
have shown, that premise is unoriginalist and backward, because it takes
interpretive license from a silence that is entirely understandable in light of
the then-universally accepted understanding that corporations were crea-
tures of government that had only such rights as were specifically granted to
them.147  A corporation was the opposite of a Lockean-Jeffersonian human
being with inalienable rights: corporations possessed no rights except those
that were granted to them by the government.148  It would be more faithful
to originalism to recognize that silence in terms of whether corporations
were granted rights weighs against the conclusion that they had those rights.
Justice Scalia is also poorly positioned to chide Justice Stevens for not
producing any evidence that corporations could participate in the electoral
process at the time of the Founding.149  Given the heavy restrictions on cor-
porate powers two hundred years ago, the burden should be on Justice Scalia
to demonstrate that corporations had remarkable powers that even now
many of us find strange and novel.  All the evidence indicates that a state
could restrict a corporation from speaking if it deemed that such speech was
not in the public interest.  And it also appears that the managers and stock-
holders of early corporations accepted that they were restricted from speak-
ing in elections, for we have found no evidence that business corporations
attempted to engage in political speech about the time of the Founding.  No
charter as of the Founding era exists of which we are aware that empowered a
corporation to act on the political process by spending money to influence
it.150
145 See supra Section II.B.
146 See, e.g., O’Kelley, supra note 9, at 1352.
147 Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at 1663.
148 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT, 195 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1689) (“To understand political power right, and derive it from its
original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect
freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think
fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the
will of any other man.”).
149 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 386 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
150 See supra note 134 (collecting early charters).  Professor Hurst summarized the fun-
damental attributes of early American corporations as the rights “to sue and be sued, to
hold and transfer title to real or personal property, [and] to act with legal effect under a
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This discussion is enough to establish that Justice Scalia’s view of corpo-
rate speech rights at the time of the Founding is without strong historical
foundation.  Because his concurrence rested solely on Founding-era history,
we could conclude here.  But because we wish to show that, under any
approach to originalism, it is not possible to ground the outcome in Citizens
United on originalist reasoning alone, we now discuss whether corporations
would have been deemed to have speech rights after 1868, because of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. CORPORATIONS IN THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD
We now trace the development of corporations’ rights from 1800 to the
Civil War.  Our intent here is to determine whether anything about the pub-
lic conception of a corporation had changed by the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868.  The short answer is no.
A. Asserting a Constitutional Right: Individuals and Corporations
We now turn to the question of who or what possessed a right guaran-
teed under the Constitution.  In his originalist concurrence to Citizens United,
Justice Scalia acknowledges that this is a relevant issue.151  An analysis of the
evidence demonstrates that it was not the public understanding that humans
could form a corporation that would have the same rights as the humans who
created it.  In fact, the prevailing public understanding was quite to the
contrary.
An early Chief Justice Marshall decision, Bank of United States v. Deveaux,
decided in 1809, is relevant to our inquiry.152 Deveaux was the first in a tril-
ogy of important cases involving unsuccessful state attempts to tax the Bank
of the United States.153  In Deveaux, the board of the First National Bank
sued two Georgia state officials who had used $2,000 from the Savannah
branch of the Bank to pay a Georgia state tax.154  The board sued first in the
Circuit Court for the District of Georgia, and the defendants filed a plea in
abatement on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
Bank.155  The district court, composed of Justice Johnson riding circuit and
District Judge Stephens, sustained the plea in abatement for lack of diversity
jurisdiction, albeit with reluctance.156  First, the court rejected the suggestion
that the board members could sue in their individual capacities, because, if
common seal,” as well as certain special privileges granted in specific cases (such as the
right to operate turnpikes, canals, etc.). HURST, supra note 16, at 19–20.
151 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 391–92.
152 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
153 The others were McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), and Osborn
v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
154 Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) at 62–63.
155 Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 2 F. Cas. 692, No. 916 (C.C.D. Ga. 1808) (per curiam),
rev’d, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
156 Id. at 693.
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so, “they must have sued by their baptismal names.”157  But the court also
rejected the alternative, which was that the Bank could sue as a corporation.
The rights of individuals did not “pass through” to corporations, as Justice
Scalia argues in his concurrence in Citizens United:
[T]he individual is so totally sunk in their corporate state of existence, that
though it were true in fact, that the president, directors and company were
all citizens of the state of Pennsylvania, still they could not communicate
their right of suing in this court to the corporate body of which they are
members.158
The Supreme Court reversed—but only to the barest extent possible to
avoid the “embarrassment”159 that would be caused if the Bank were not able
to protect its interests by suing in federal court.160  First, Chief Justice Mar-
shall reaffirmed that “[A] corporation . . . is certainly not a citizen.”161  The
Court thus accepted the district court’s conclusion on this point.  But the
Supreme Court rejected the district court’s view that a corporation could
never sue in the federal courts.  Rather, a court would, “for legitimate pur-
poses” and “when the general spirit and purpose of the law requires it,” con-
sider a corporation as a “company of individuals.”162
Deveaux severely restricted the ability of corporations to sue in federal
court.  Indeed, it was acknowledged to be a “pure fiction” that the “members”
of the Bank were all citizens of Pennsylvania, a fact that the Bank had alleged
to support diversity jurisdiction.163  Thus, corporations whose protection was
less important as a matter of national policy were effectively barred from the
federal courts.164  And although the Court held that a corporation could be
considered as a “company of individuals” for jurisdictional purposes, it did
not suggest that it would pierce the corporate veil and look through to the
individuals comprising the corporation for any purposes that were not inci-
dental to the corporation’s existence—such as spending money on a political
campaign.  Indeed, any such a holding would have been odd, because Justice
Johnson, while sitting on the district court, had emphatically endorsed the
view that “individual[s] [are] so totally sunk in their corporate state of exis-
tence” that they could not transmit rights to the corporation.165  Thus, Jus-




160 Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87–88 (1809).
161 Id. at 86.
162 Id. at 87, 89, 90.
163 Charles Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 VA. L. REV. 661, 666–67
(1933).
164 Id.
165 Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 2 F. Cas. 692, 693, No. 916 (C.C.D. Ga. 1808) (per curiam).
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right to speak in association with other individual persons” appears incorrect
as a historical matter.166
And even if Deveaux could be construed in support of that view, it was
overruled thirty-five years later in Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston Rail-road
Co. v. Letson.167  There, the Court held that a corporation could sue in its
own name, and its residence was its chartering state.168  The Court also went
out of its way to state that the late Chief Justice Marshall had “repeatedly
expressed regret” about the Deveaux decision, and that he wished the out-
come had been different.169  After Letson, a corporation was treated as an
entity for the sake of federal jurisdiction, and the Court explicitly rejected
the notion that stockholders could assert their own, individual, rights
through the corporation.  As the Court put it in Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad Co. in 1853, nine years later: “[F]or all the purposes of acting, con-
tracting, and judicial remedy, [the stockholders] can speak, act, and plead,
only through their representatives or curators [i.e., the board of
directors].”170
As Deveaux, Letson, and Marshall made plain, a corporation could only
exercise rights in its corporate name.  If we pierce the corporate veil and
argue that the corporation can exercise the personal rights of its individual
stockholders, we must assume that all these stockholders would want to
express the same views on the particular topic at hand (unless the corpora-
tion is entitled to express more than one view on a particular matter).  But, as
the Marshall Court observed, stockholders are “numerous unknown and ever-
changing associates,” and may dissent from the majority view.171  Justice
Scalia’s argument in his Citizens United concurrence that corporations should
be regarded as associations of individuals for the purpose of exercising First
Amendment rights thus seems to be at odds with historical understandings of
the corporation and the reality of diverse stockholder ownership, including
the early understanding that it was not credible to equate the views of the
corporation to those of its diverse and changing stockholders.
B. Judicial Treatment of Corporations Before the Civil War
We now move to a more general discussion of judicial decisions affecting
corporations in the antebellum period.  As James Willard Hurst has written,
“[f]rom the first years in which we made much use of the corporate device,
statute law defined the . . . basic terms on which the legal order would legiti-
mate use of the corporation.”172  The rights of corporations were not some-
166 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis
omitted).
167 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 555 (1844).
168 Id. at 559.
169 Id. at 555.
170 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1853).
171 Id.
172 HURST, supra note 16, at 122 (emphasis added).
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thing for courts to define; they were for the legislature to define.173  “This
was legislative, not judicial, business.  It was so for reasons of constitutional
force; only to the popularly elected assemblies did we concede authority to
deal with the social balance of power” that would be affected by corpora-
tions.174  In the federal courts—that is, the courts of the government that did
not generally charter corporations—“[a] substantial body of . . . constitu-
tional law” eventually emerged concerning the rights and limits on business
corporations, but this body of law developed under the later “broad lan-
guage” of the Fourteenth Amendment, and never once related to questions
of corporate political speech.175
Before the Civil War, courts did impinge on state legislatures’ abilities to
regulate corporations in limited ways.  Two important early cases relate to
universities.  At issue in Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy was a
state statute that purported to confiscate all the property of the University of
North Carolina that had escheated to that university.176  The North Carolina
Supreme Court held that this statute was unconstitutional, and based its deci-
sion in part on the “law of the land” clause from the North Carolina Bill of
Rights, which provided that “no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or
disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in
any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the
law of the land.”177  The state conceded the legislature would have had no
power to confiscate property from an individual, but denied that corpora-
tions had the same protection.  The court disagreed: it held that it was “clear”
that the law of the land clause “was intended to secure to corporations as well
as to individuals the rights therein enumerated.”178
Following Foy, “the law of the land clauses of the states generally seemed
destined to become bulwarks for vested corporate rights.”179  This progress
was arrested, however, by the famous Dartmouth College decision, which held
that the legislature of New Hampshire could not force the college to become
a public institution.180  The Court’s decision, however, was based on the Con-
173 Id.
174 Id. at 123.
175 Id. at 114.
176 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 57, 57–58 (1805).
177 Id. at 62 (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XII).
178 Id.  This supposed “clarity” was based on a tenuous distinction between “liberties” in
the first part of the clause and “liberty” in the latter part:
That this clause was intended to secure to corporations as well as to individuals
the rights therein enumerated, seems clear from the word “liberties,” which pecu-
liarly signifies those privileges and rights which corporations have by virtue of the
instruments which incorporate them, and is certainly used in this clause in con-
tradistinction to the word “liberty,” which refers to the personal liberty of the
citizen.
Id.
179 Howard Jay Graham, The “Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment: 2, 48 YALE
L.J. 171, 172 (1938).
180 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819).
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tracts Clause, not the Due Process Clause.181  The purpose of the Contracts
Clause, Chief Justice Marshall held, was to “restrain the legislature in future
from violating the right to property.”182  And the charter of the college was
“plainly a contract to which the donors, the trustees, and the crown, (to
whose rights and obligations New-Hampshire succeeds,) were the original
parties. . . .  It is a contract for the security and disposition of property.”183
But, in holding that the Trustees could enforce this charter like a contract,
the Court emphasized the limited rights possessed by a corporation:
 A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only
in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only
those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.  These are such as are sup-
posed best calculated to effect the object for which it was created.184
Marshall’s holding is consistent both with contemporary practice and
the descriptions of the corporation by Coke, Blackstone, and Kyd, described
in Part IV.  And this famous description of a corporation—that it is an “artifi-
cial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law”—
was reaffirmed scores of times before the Civil War.185  (Indeed, it was also
reaffirmed scores of times after the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted,
which is powerful evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment was not seen as
changing the rights of corporations, as we discuss further in the next
Part.186)  Given the weight of this history, Justice Scalia’s contention that
there is no evidence that corporations were not permitted to participate
freely in the political process seems to ignore the most prominent source of
public understanding.
In fact, even as to property rights closely connected to the business inter-
ests of a corporation, the courts were reluctant to give corporations constitu-
tional protections.  In the 1837 case of Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v.
Proprietors of Warren Bridge, the Court ruled that the Massachusetts legislature
had the power to grant a company a charter to build a new, free, bridge over
the Charles River, even though the bridge would interfere with a for-profit
181 Id. at 627.
182 Id. at 628.
183 Id. at 643–44.
184 Id. at 636; William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspec-
tives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1505 (1989) (“Since the corporation is not a natu-
ral person it has no ability to formulate its own purposes and follow them.  Less than a
person, it is only a means to prescribed ends.”).
185 Dartmouth, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636.  The phrase “existing only in contemplation of
law” appears first in the reporter’s notes in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 61, 73 (1809) (emphasis omitted).  It was then used simultaneously in Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s Dartmouth decision and in the Connecticut case of Bulkley v. Derby Fishing
Co., 2 Conn. 252, 260 (1817), both of which were published in November 1817.  A Westlaw
search for “existing only in contemplation of law” returns thirty-four cases involving corpo-
rations between Dartmouth and 1860.
186 According to a Westlaw search, the phrase “existing only in contemplation of law”
appears in over fifty cases involving corporations between 1860 and 1900.
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bridge nearby, the Warren Bridge.187  The Warren Bridge company’s charter
did not grant an explicit monopoly on traffic over the Charles, and so the
Warren Bridge argued that it received such a monopoly by implication: it
held its franchise through a contract with the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, and the legislature could not unilaterally destroy the value of its
franchise.  The Court rejected this argument, applying a well-settled rule of
decision that grants to private corporations affecting the public interest were
to be narrowly construed.188  Thus, Chief Justice Taney wrote, “[t]hat a cor-
poration is strictly limited to the exercise of those powers which are specifi-
cally conferred on it, will not be denied.  The exercise of the corporate
franchise being restrictive of individual rights, cannot be extended beyond
the letter and spirit of the act of incorporation.”189
The Charles River Bridge case shows that states retained the power to regu-
late their corporations, not the courts.  And two years later, the Court (again
speaking through Chief Justice Taney) affirmed a state’s power to regulate
foreign corporations in Bank of Augusta v. Earle.190  The question was
whether a corporation that was chartered in one state could validly enter into
contracts in another state.  The Court quoted Dartmouth College’s statement
that a corporation was a “mere creature of the law” and only had properties
that were expressly given it in the charter or “incidental to [the corpora-
tion’s] very existence.”191  The Court ruled that, under principles of comity,
a corporation chartered in one state could enter into binding contracts in
another state.  But the Court also recognized a restriction on this principle: if
a state “indicates that contracts which derive their validity from its comity are
repugnant to its policy, or are considered as injurious to its interests,” it need
not give effect to those contracts.192
Charles River Bridge and Bank of Augusta made clear that a corporation
was under the control of its chartering state and any state where it conducted
business.  Lawyers for business corporations chafed against these restrictions
and challenged state powers over their clients in court.193  They appeared
poised for a breakthrough in the 1850s, when the New York Court of Appeals
handed down two decisions that accepted that vested property rights were
protected by the due process clause of the state constitution.  In Westervelt v.
Gregg, the Court of Appeals ruled that a husband had a vested interest in a
legacy bequeathed to his wife before the enactment of the Married Women’s
Property Act in 1848.194  And in Wynehamer v. People, the Court of Appeals
ruled that a state prohibition statute could not criminalize the possession and
187 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
188 Id. at 544–46.
189 Id. at 546 (quoting Beaty v. Lessee of Knowler, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 152, 168 (1830)).
190 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
191 Id. at 587 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,
636 (1819)).
192 Id. at 592.
193 See generally Graham, supra note 179, at 171–81.
194 12 N.Y. 202 (1854).
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sale of alcohol acquired before the statute went into effect.195  About the
same time, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that
vested property rights were protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution.196
Nevertheless, the use of the Due Process Clause to protect the rights of
corporations was set back when the New York Court of Appeals refused to
apply the Clause in favor of out-of-state insurance companies who were chal-
lenging a tax levied on all fire premiums to support the New York Fire
Department.197  It may be that the court was motivated by criticism of
Wynehamer.198  And criticism of Chief Justice Taney’s infamous decision in
Dred Scott, which also relied on a theory of substantive due process, may have
contributed to the limited success of later efforts of corporations to obtain
the protections of due process clauses.199  But it appears that shortly before
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, corporations still had not
even generally obtained constitutional protections of their property rights
and remained subject to restrictions on their conduct by their chartering
states and the jurisdictions in which they operated.
C. General Incorporation Statutes and External Regulation
We now examine the law under which corporations were chartered.  As
we have described, until the early years of the nineteenth century, all corpo-
rations were created through special charters.  These corporations were few
in number and subject to tight restrictions on their business activities.  There-
fore, there was little need for external regulation.  With the exception of
transportation and finance, “state regulation was rather random and plan-
less.”200  And not only was regulation haphazard, there was little money to
enforce external regulation, so private citizens usually had to enforce what
rules there were in a lawsuit or through a complaint to a state official.201  But,
because corporations were far weaker than they are now, the failings of state
regulation were not a critical concern.
All this began to change in the nineteenth century with the move toward
general incorporation statutes.  Under these statutes, any organization that
fulfilled the statutory requirements could be incorporated without petition-
ing for a special charter.  Just as business corporations postdated other forms
of corporation, so general incorporation statutes were initially enacted for
195 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
196 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852).
197 Graham, supra note 179, at 177–78.
198 Id.  The Court of Appeals cast doubt on Wynehamer ten years later. See Metro. Bd. of
Excise v. Barrie, 34 N.Y. 657, 668 (1866) (holding that state statute restricting liquor sales
was a proper exercise of the police power, and disapproving the “inconsiderate dicta of
some of the judges in the case of Wynehamer v. The People”).
199 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see Graham, supra note 179,
at 178 n.42.
200 FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 125.
201 Id. at 128–29.
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the benefit of religious and charitable organizations.202  The first general
incorporation statute for businesses was passed by New York in 1811, but only
covered manufacturing companies, and was not imitated by other states.203
In the 1830s, Pennsylvania and Connecticut enacted their general incorpora-
tion laws.  These laws were copied by other states, and by 1859, twenty-four of
the thirty-eight then-existing states or territories had general incorporation
statutes.204
The rise of general incorporation statutes, and the corresponding
increase in the number of corporations, did not mean that states relin-
quished their abilities to regulate corporations.  For starters, many states did
not permit all corporations to take advantage of their general incorporation
statutes.  Certain types of corporation, such as railroads and banks, still
required special charters.205  It was no accident that these activities had the
greatest impact on interstate commerce, and thus were the most difficult to
regulate.  States continued to issue special charters for these types of corpora-
tions until stronger federal regulation emerged in these industries in the
1930s.206  The new incorporation regime in the first half of the nineteenth
century was not entirely liberal.  Most state legislatures adopted constitu-
tional or statutory rules allowing them to change or revoke corporate char-
ters at will, and courts continued to construe the rights conferred by
corporate charters narrowly.207
Originalists also have to struggle with more specific aspects of the ruling
in Citizens United.  Under McCain-Feingold, the government did not bar cor-
porations from engaging in any political activity.  To the contrary, corpora-
tions were authorized to use corporate resources to establish political action
committees that could solicit voluntary contributions from employees and
stockholders, which could then be used by the corporate PAC to make politi-
cal expenditures, including ones expressly advocating the election or defeat
of a political candidate.208  Remember that as of 1791, corporations were
legislatively chartered and could only conduct such activities as were specifi-
cally enumerated in their charters.  But even after corporations were given
more leeway under general incorporation statutes, corporate law limited the
freedom of corporations to act in many ways without unanimous consent of
the stockholders.  As of 1868 and even into the twentieth century, for exam-
ple, the general rule was that a corporation could not merge with another
202 HURST, supra note 16, at 134.
203 See Hamill, supra note 13, at 101.
204 Id. at 101–03.
205 Id. at 105–06.
206 Id. at 146–59.
207 SEAVOY, supra note 62, at 240–42.  This restriction on corporate rights was paralleled
by the judicial doctrine that charters were to be narrowly construed. Id.
208 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006) (defining “contribution” to exclude contributions to
“separate segregated fund[s]” established by corporations, i.e., PACs); see also 11 C.F.R.
§ 114.2 (2009) (setting out regulations for contributions by corporations, and by and to
their PACs).
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corporation without unanimous consent.209  Viewed through that originalist
prism, McCain-Feingold can be viewed as simply a requirement that the cor-
poration only make such contributions as its stockholders voluntarily author-
ize it to make, by using a PAC as the collection mechanism for that purpose.
That seems a far lesser constraint than barring any political contributions
unless unanimous consent was obtained from all stockholders.
As important, states countered the potentially negative effects of the
growth in the number of corporations under general statutes by strengthen-
ing the external regulation of corporations.210  One scholar has written that
in the 1850s “the focus of American legislation slowly began to shift from
promotion of economic development towards greater regulation of that
development.”211  States began to create regulatory commissions or special
departments within state governments to control corporations.212  The first
regulatory commission in New York, the Bank Commission, was established
in 1829.213  An insurance commission followed.  New York did not establish a
railroad commission, although other states, such as Rhode Island in 1839,
did.214  These methods of state control over corporations to some extent
made up for the absence of federal regulation, which was hindered in large
part by the dispute over slavery.215  As we discuss later, after the Civil War,
federal regulation over corporations increased substantially.216
The general incorporation statutes were also comparatively restrictive by
modern standards.217  For example, general incorporation acts set restric-
tions on capitalization, and businesses in the mid-nineteenth century would
still need to obtain special charters to avoid these restrictions.218  “To the
209 See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law: Validation
Under the Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97, 109 (1999) (noting that
corporate law required unanimous consent of stockholders for “extraordinary transac-
tions” (citing People v. Ballard, 32 N.E. 54, 59 (N.Y. 1892); Abbot v. Am. Hard Rubber Co.,
33 Barb. 578, 590–93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1861)); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 249 (1962) (“Old rules requiring unanim-
ity for action by the homely small enterprise could no longer work for the large impersonal
collectivity [in the late nineteenth century.]”); see also, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590, 595–96 (1921) (“It is, of course, a general rule of law [that
directors could not sell all the assets of a company without unanimous stockholder
consent].”).
210 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at 1627–33 (noting that general incorporation
acts shortly preceded state regulation of industries); see also David Millon, Theories of the
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206 (noting that states that adopted general incorporation
acts made charters available upon “submission to standardized substantive regulations”).
211 Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 327 (1985).
212 SEAVOY, supra note 62, at 242.
213 Id. at 243.
214 FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 334; SEAVOY, supra note 62, at 244.
215 SEAVOY, supra note 62, at 252.
216 See infra Section VI.D.
217 See HURST, supra note 16, at 29.
218 Id.; see generally SEAVOY, supra note 62, at 199–224.
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end of the nineteenth century corporation law often built some regulations
into corporate structure to protect general social interests.”219  As we discuss
further below, general incorporation statutes only became more liberal
around the turn of the century, when New Jersey led the way in removing
restrictions on cross-shareholdings and foreign business dealings.220
D. Treatises
Finally, we examine the corporate law treatises that were published
before the Civil War.  If we were to find support for the view that nineteenth
century corporations had broad expressive rights, we might expect to find it
in the hornbooks.  But these too are silent, and what they say emphasizes that
corporations were not rights-bearers like human beings.
In 1826, Chancellor James Kent published his Commentaries on American
Law, which remained in print throughout the century.  He noted that a cor-
poration could only carry out those acts that it was authorized to perform in
its charter or those that were “inseparably incident to [it].”221  Kent’s list of
incidental powers is similar to Coke’s, Blackstone’s, and Kyd’s:
1. To have perpetual succession, and, of course, the power of electing mem-
bers in the room of those removed by death or otherwise; 2. To sue and be
sued, and to grant and to receive by their corporate name; 3. To purchase
and hold lands and chattels; 4. To have a common seal; 5. To make by-laws
for the government of the corporation; 6. The power of amotion, or removal
of members.222
According to Kent: “A corporation being merely a political institution, it
has no other capacities or powers than those which are necessary to carry
into effect the purposes for which it was established.  A corporation is incapa-
ble of a personal act in its collective capacity.”223  This casts doubt on Justice
Scalia’s contention that the Founders would have seen a corporation as an
association of individuals who were permitted to exercise speech rights in
corporate form.  Kent also stressed that a corporation’s powers were strictly
construed:
The modern doctrine is to consider corporations as having such powers as
are specifically granted by the act of incorporation, or as are necessary for
the purpose of carrying into effect the powers expressly granted, and as not
having any other.  The Supreme Court of the United States declared this
obvious doctrine, and it has been repeated in the decisions of the state
courts.  No rule of law comes with a more reasonable application, consider-
ing how lavishly charter privileges have been granted.  As corporations are
the mere creatures of law, established for special purposes, and derive all
their powers from the acts creating them, it is perfectly just and proper that
they should be obliged strictly to show their authority for the business they
219 HURST, supra note 16, at 161.
220 Id. at 147.
221 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *277 (1826).
222 Id. at *277–78.
223 Id. at *279.
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assume, and be confined in their operations to the mode, and manner, and
subject-matter prescribed.224
The 1832 treatise of Joseph Angell, the Rhode Island legal scholar and
court reporter, and Samuel Ames, the Chief Justice of Rhode Island, is consis-
tent with Kent’s Commentaries.225  For a definition of a corporation, Angell
and Ames looked to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Dartmouth College: “ ‘A
corporation,’ says the Chief Justice, ‘is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law.’”226  After reviewing Blackstone
and Kyd, they compare a corporation to natural persons: “A corporation . . .
is a political institution merely, and it has, therefore, no other capacities than
such as are necessary to effect the purpose of its creation.”227
Later in their work, Angell and Ames discussed further the limitations of
a corporate charter, which was an “executed contract between the govern-
ment and the corporators.”228  But, to avoid the strictures of the contracts
clause,
it has become usual for legislatures, in acts of incorporation for private pur-
poses, to reserve to themselves a power to alter, modify, or repeal the charter
at their pleasure; and as the power of modification and repeal is thus made a
qualifying part of the grant of franchises, the exercise of that power cannot,
of course, impair the obligation of the grant.229
The corporation’s property, Angell and Ames stated, was not entirely at
the mercy of the legislature.  Rather,
 [a]s all or any of the property of a citizen may, upon just compensation
made, be taken, and applied to the use of the public, so all property belong-
ing to a corporation must in like manner be held liable to the same eminent
domain, or peculiar power of the government.230
But there is no suggestion that a corporation shared the political rights of
human citizens as well as their property rights.231
224 Id. at *298–99 (footnotes omitted).
225 ANGELL & AMES, supra note 135.  Angell’s and Ames’s treatise remained in print
throughout the nineteenth century, and the 1871 twelfth edition was edited by Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes.
226 Id. at 2 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636
(1819)).
227 Id. at 3.
228 Id. at 503.
229 Id. at 504.
230 JOSEPH K. ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
AGGREGATE 166 (John Lathrop ed., 10th ed. 1875) (emphasis omitted); see also id. § 477, at
495 (“[T]he [corporate] franchise is not to be distinguished from other property; every
kind of property being equally protected by the constitution.”).
231 Just as the conception of the corporation in America did not change before the
1860s in America, nor did it change in England.  The first treatise on corporations (as
opposed to joint-stock companies) since Kyd’s was published by James Grant in 1850.  Con-
sistent with the earlier English and American authorities, Grant wrote that a corporation
“is in fact an abstraction of law, having no existence or power of action but what the law
gives it.” JAMES GRANT, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 3 (1850).
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V. THE UNDERSTANDING OF CORPORATIONS AS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
As we have discussed, the rule as of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment was that stated by Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College:
that a corporation “possesse[d] only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it,” and that it had no “political power, or a political
character.”232  Although there were some discrete cases when corporations
were allowed to assert constitutional rights, those cases involved government
action that threatened a core property interest critical to the corporation’s
ability to conduct the business it was chartered to conduct.233  We next
examine whether the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to change this
understanding of corporate rights and to accord the same rights to them as
persons born or naturalized in the United States.
A. The Text
As we did with the First Amendment, we start with the text.  The first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.234
This text does not suggest in any way that corporations are persons for
the purposes of the Amendment’s clauses protecting “citizens” and “per-
sons.”235  Because corporations are not citizens, the only textual basis for the
argument that corporations should be protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment comes from the use of the word “person” in the due process and equal
protection clauses.  But the argument that the use of the word “person”
rather than “citizen” was a deliberate attempt to bring corporations under
the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment has been refuted, as there is
Where the corporation derived its corporate status from a charter (as opposed to common
law or prescription), it could not “pursue any other objects than those specified in its
charters.” Id. at 13.
232 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
233 E.g., Trs. of Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 57 (1805) (holding invalid an act
transferring property from the University of North Carolina to the state).
234 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
235 See, e.g., Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 101 (2005) (“It is
beyond debate that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to corporations on its
face.”).
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no historical evidence supporting that intention.236  And, based on the text
of the Fourteenth Amendment alone, one would likely conclude that corpo-
rations are not persons: the first clause of the Amendment suggests that all
“persons” must be capable of being “born” or “naturalized.”237  We suspect
that Justice Scalia himself would rightly cast ridicule on the idea that a legisla-
ture gave “birth” to a domestic corporation or “naturalized” a foreign one by
allowing it to incorporate in the United States.
Any argument, then, that corporations had the same rights as natural
persons must be based on the historical notion of corporate personhood in
1868, not the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.  We therefore proceed to
the second stage of Justice Scalia’s inquiry and look to the historical concep-
tion of the rights of corporations at the time of the ratification of the Four-
teenth Amendment and whether that Amendment somehow altered it.
B. Case Law After the Fourteenth Amendment
By the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the concept
that a business corporation could be deemed a legal person for certain pur-
poses was established in American law.238  So it was unsurprising that lawyers
for business corporations continued to argue that their clients should be
afforded the rights of citizens.  In Paul v. Virginia in 1868, an insurance com-
pany challenged a Virginia statute that provided that any foreign insurer
doing business in Virginia should have to deposit with the state treasurer
bonds issued by the state or by state residents of at least $30,000 in value.239
The insurer argued that Virginia’s regulation violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution.  The Court
rejected this challenge easily:
 The answer which readily occurs to the objection founded upon the first
clause consists in the fact that corporations are not citizens within its mean-
ing.  The term citizens as there used applies only to natural persons, mem-
bers of the body politic, owing allegiance to the State, not to artificial
persons created by the legislature, and possessing only the attributes which
the legislature has prescribed.240
Even though, as we have described above, general incorporation statutes
were by then commonplace, the Court noted that “a grant of corporate exis-
tence is a grant of special privileges to the corporators, enabling them to act
236 Graham, supra note 179, at 194 (“Section One was not designed to aid corporations,
nor was the distinction between ‘citizens’ and ‘persons’ conceived for their benefit.”)
(emphasis omitted); see also Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 1, at 6–10.
237 As Justice Black put it in his dissent in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. John-
son, “[c]ertainly a corporation cannot be naturalized.”  303 U.S. 77, 88 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
238 Graham, supra note 179, at 194; see, e.g., Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 314, 328 (1853) (considering a corporation a citizen of its chartering state for
purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction).
239 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
240 Id. at 177.
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for certain designated purposes as a single individual, and exempting them
(unless otherwise specially provided) from individual liability.”241  The Court
thus reaffirmed Bank of Augusta v. Earle.242  This evidence suggests that the
Fourteenth Amendment had not changed the constitutional status of
corporations.
Nevertheless, the Fourteenth Amendment did not leave the rights of
corporations completely unaffected.  Rather, as respected scholars such as
Professors Bloch, Lamoreaux, and O’Kelley have shown, corporations were
able to use the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure that they
had the same protections that individuals had when conducting business,
when such protections were necessary and incidental to their business.  Thus,
from the 1880s to the mid-twentieth century, the Court adhered to a con-
struction of the Fourteenth Amendment whereby corporations were entitled
to property rights, but were not deemed to have liberty interests.243
This construction of the Fourteenth Amendment was largely the work of
Justice Stephen Field, who served on the Supreme Court between 1863 and
1897.  Justice Field rode circuit in California, alongside a local federal judge,
and heard two important suits involving the right of California to tax rail-
roads.  Both suits involved the California Constitution of 1879’s imposition of
discriminatory taxation on railroads.  Under the California Constitution,
owners of property were generally permitted to deduct liens secured on their
property from its valuation for tax purposes.244  The State did not lose tax
revenue this way: it taxed the lienholders directly.245  But, railroads were spe-
cifically not permitted to deduct liens or mortgage interests, and each county
was permitted to tax the property of the railroad within the county at its
“actual value.”246  The California railroads refused to pay the additional tax,
claiming that it was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.247
The counties that were losing tax revenue filed suit in federal court.
The suits were consolidated into two: County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific
241 Id. at 181.  This casts doubt on the thesis that the rise of general incorporation
statutes spelled the end of the concession theory of the corporation. See O’Melinn, supra
note 99, at 229–40.
242 Paul, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 178–82.  Three years later, the opinion in Bank of Augusta
was described as “very able and satisfactory” in an 1875 edition of Joseph Angell’s and
Samuel Ames’s treatise (originally published in 1831), indicating that academics likewise
considered it still good precedent. ANGELL & SAMUEL, supra note 230, § 273, at 264.
243 See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (“The liberty
referred to in [the Fourteenth] Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial per-
sons.”); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906) (holding that a corporation was entitled to the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, but was not
entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination); see also Bloch &
Lamoreaux, supra note 1, at 30. R
244 CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XIII, § 4.
245 Id.
246 Id. art. XIII, § 10.
247 O’Kelley, supra note 9, at 1353–54.
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Railroad Co.248 and County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.249  In
the wide-ranging opinion in San Mateo, Justice Field rejected numerous argu-
ments by the County that the discriminatory tax should be sustained.  First,
Justice Field held that the Fourteenth Amendment “impose[d] a limitation
upon the exercise of all the powers of the state which can touch the individ-
ual or his property, including among them that of taxation.”250  Thus, the
state could not tax individuals unequally.  But next, Justice Field had to show
that the corporation should be considered an individual for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of property rights.  Justice Field
rejected the County’s argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was
designed simply to protect freedmen, but ruled that its guarantees encom-
passed everyone, even a “master of millions.”251  And, because corporations
were so important in all aspects of modern life, “[i]t would be a most singular
result if a constitutional provision intended for the protection of every per-
son . . . should cease to exert such protection the moment the person
becomes a member of a corporation.”252
Field set out a clear process of reasoning for determining which constitu-
tional rights were possessed by corporations—a vision that Professor O’Kelley
has termed “the Field rationale.”253  A corporation had constitutionally pro-
tected property rights because “[t]o deprive the corporation of its prop-
erty . . . is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property.”254  Thus, the
corporation’s property was constitutionally protected for the sake of carrying
on its business.  But “the same clause of the . . . amendment [protecting life
and liberty] does not apply to corporations, because . . . the lives and liberties
of the individual corporators are not the life and liberty of the corpora-
tion.”255  In Professor O’Kelley’s words, “the constitutional rights of a busi-
ness corporation . . . must be coextensive with the rights that its shareholders
would enjoy if they had chosen to conduct their business in an unincorpo-
rated form.”256  But, “only natural persons can assert natural liberties, as
opposed to rights necessary to protect property.”257
The Southern Pacific Railroad Company thus prevailed in San Mateo.258
In Santa Clara, Justice Field again ruled that California’s railroad companies
could not be required to pay the discriminatory tax.259 Santa Clara was then
248 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882).
249 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
250 San Mateo, 13 F. at 733 (emphasis added).
251 Id. at 741.
252 Id. at 744; see Horwitz, supra note 88, at 182 (discussing the “model of the corpora-
tion[ ] emphasizing the property rights of shareholders” put forth in Santa Clara by Justice
Field).
253 O’Kelley, supra note 9, at 1356.
254 San Mateo, 13 F. at 747.
255 Id.
256 O’Kelley, supra note 9, at 1356.
257 Id.
258 San Mateo, 13 F. at 754.
259 Cty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
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appealed to the Supreme Court, where the Court held for the railroads on
extremely narrow grounds—that the cost of fences separating the tracks from
neighboring land had been erroneously included in the assessment.260  It
seems that the Court chose this ground deliberately so that “there [would] be
no occasion to consider the grave questions of constitutional law upon which
the case was determined below.”261  But despite this, Santa Clara is famous
for its supposed holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects corpora-
tions.  As Professors Bloch and Lamoreaux explain, the Supreme Court
reporter, J.C. Bancroft Davis, wrote at the start of the opinion a paraphrase of
the pre-argument statement of Chief Justice Waite that “[t]he court does not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the [Equal Protection Clause
of] the Fourteenth Amendment . . . applies to these corporations.  We are all
of opinion that it does.”262
This cursory dictum showing support by the Supreme Court for Justice
Field’s holdings below in the San Mateo and Santa Clara cases later became
law when it was cited and relied on by Justice Field in other cases.263  Thus, in
an 1888 case involving Pennsylvania’s license tax on foreign corporations
having an office in the Commonwealth, Justice Field wrote, for a unanimous
Court: “Under the designation of person [in the Fourteenth Amendment]
there is no doubt that a private corporation is included.”264  The following
year, in a railroad case, Justice Field held—relying on Santa Clara and his
ruling the previous year—that “corporations are persons within the meaning
of [the Equal Protection Clause].”265
Thus, the Field rationale took hold: a corporation should have “such
rights . . . coextensive with the rights that its shareholders would enjoy if they
had chosen to conduct their business in an unincorporated form.”266  The
emphasis we added is important because Field’s reasoning applied only to
those constitutional property rights essential to conducting business.267  Even
then, this did not mean that corporations were necessarily successful in
asserting their property rights.  As Professors Bloch and Lamoreaux observe,
Justice Field regularly upheld state laws regulating domestic corporations,
provided that they affected corporations equally.268  He also upheld state
laws that discriminated against foreign corporations.269  The 1888 and 1889
cases cited above are precisely in point: there, Field sustained Pennsylvania’s
260 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
261 Id. at 411.
262 Id. at 396; see Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 1, at 11. R
263 Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 1, at 12. R
264 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189
(1888).
265 Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889).
266 O’Kelley, supra note 9, at 1356 (emphasis added).
267 See, e.g., Cty. of San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 13 F. 722, 747 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882)
(“The prohibition against the deprivation of life and liberty in the same clause of the fifth
amendment does not apply to corporations . . . .”).
268 Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 1, at 12.
269 Id. at 16.
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license tax on foreign corporations,270 and an Iowa statute providing for
double damages on a strict liability basis when a train killed livestock.271  The
only restriction on a state’s regulation of foreign corporations was that a state
was not allowed to interfere with interstate commerce—but interstate com-
merce was defined so narrowly that this rarely posed an obstacle.272
And the flipside to the Field rationale was that corporations did not have
liberty rights.  Thus, in Northwestern National Life Insurance Co. v. Riggs, in
1906, the Court sustained a Missouri statute that prevented a life insurer
from denying death benefits on the ground that the insured had made mis-
representations when taking out the policy, unless the misrepresentations
were material to the cause of death.273  The Court held: “The liberty referred
to in [the Fourteenth] Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial
persons.”274
Corporations soon became repeat players before the Court, because
they had the wealth to press cases to the top.275  And, in the Lochner era, they
were often successful.  In Professor Mayer’s words, “[o]nce armed with the
fourteenth amendment, corporations wielded it with considerable force.”276
But we are not concerned with the twentieth century evolution of corpora-
tions’ constitutional rights.  Rather, for the purposes of our originalist analy-
sis, we are concerned with the rights that corporations were deemed to
possess at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The
evidence indicates to us that even thirty and forty years after the enactment
of the Amendment, the Court only extended limited property rights to cor-
porations, sufficient to enable them to pursue their business.  We are aware
of no evidence from the case law that courts extended constitutional speech
or political rights to corporations.277
270 Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181 (1888).
271 Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
272 Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 1, at 17–18.
273 203 U.S. 243 (1906).  The Missouri statute is only one example of the “torrent” of
statutes that states passed to regulate insurance companies and protect consumers. FRIED-
MAN, supra note 100, at 414.
274 Riggs, 203 U.S. at 255.
275 FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 397.
276 Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 577, 589 (1990).
277 The Court later extended speech rights to corporations, but in a way consistent with
the Field rationale.  In Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), the Court
ruled that a newspaper could assert First Amendment rights.  O’Kelley, supra note 9, at
1360 (“[U]nder the Field rationale, a corporation whose business includes publishing a
newspaper must be able to assert first amendment rights of freedom of speech and press to
protect its business.”). In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the
Court held that the NAACP could assert its members’ right to free association, and in
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court held that the NAACP could itself assert
First Amendment rights.  But the NAACP was a nonprofit, advocacy organization, and this
associational theory of constitutional rights made sense because “[t]he NAACP’s member-
ship was limited to those holding and desiring to express the same views.”  O’Kelley, supra
note 9, at 1364.  As we stated at the outset, our inquiry concerns business corporations.
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C. Corporate Law Treatises
Just as we examined treatises published before 1868 for evidence of
whether corporations had the right to give money to support candidates for
elected office, we also examine treatises published before 1900.  These con-
firm that nothing had changed in the constitutional conception of the
corporation.
In 1881, Platt Potter published his Treatise on the Law of Corporations.278
He adopted verbatim Chief Justice Marshall’s “classic” and “practical” defini-
tion of the corporation: an “artificial being . . . possess[ing] only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly,
or as incidental to its very existence.”279  A corporation was so closely regu-
lated that it was not permitted to support, directly or indirectly, an undertak-
ing that might be beneficial to the corporation, without express
authorization in its charter.280
Of considerable interest to us is Potter’s discussion of a corporation’s
“citizenship.”  Consistent with the Court’s holding in Paul v. Virginia, Potter
observed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution did not clothe corporations with the rights of
natural persons:
 The constitution of the United States provides, that the “citizens” of each
state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the citizens of
the several states; but it has been repeatedly held that, though corporations
are “persons” for many purposes, they are not “citizens” within the foregoing
provision of the constitution so as to entitle them to all the rights and privi-
leges of natural persons.  And it is also held that the term citizen, has differ-
ent meanings in different parts of the same constitution.  Indeed, it is held
that corporations have no status even in the states creating them as
citizens . . . .281
278 PLATT POTTER, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS: GENERAL AND LOCAL, PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE, AGGREGATE AND SOLE (1879).
279 Id. at 4.
280 Id. at 51–52.
A corporation is not entitled, without express permission in the incorporating
statute, to apply its corporate powers to the support of any undertaking which
does not come within the purposes for which it was incorporated.  It is not
empowered to guarantee out of its corporate funds the payment of a dividend to
parties carrying on such undertaking, although it may be calculated to increase
the proper business of the corporation, and the majority of the corporators
approve of such application of the corporate funds, and the object of the under-
taking be in no respect contrary to the public interests.
Id.
281 Id. at 355.  Potter’s statement that corporations could be citizens for some purposes
of the Constitution referred to the diversity jurisdiction established by Article 3, Section 2,
which provides that “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . . between a State and
Citizens of another state [and] between Citizens of different States.” U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2; 1 POTTER, supra note 278, at 356.
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Corporations were “of course” not entitled to exercise the rights of natu-
ral persons, Potter wrote, drawing a comparison between persons and corpo-
rations that is reminiscent of the Declaration of Independence:282
A citizen, in the strict and proper sense of [the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2], if a citizen of one state, is, for most purposes
a citizen of all the states; and is entitled to all such privileges and immunities
within the purview of the constitution as the citizens of those states perma-
nently residing therein are entitled to.  These are personal privileges, and
attach to him in every state into which he may enter as a human being—as
personal faculties, to appreciate and enjoy them as a man made in God’s
own image, as distinguished from that mainly technical, intangible, legal
entity, an indivisible artificial being called a corporation.283
Potter next approvingly cited a decision from the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois, affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, that corporations had no
right to be involved in the political process:
As has been said, “the individual citizen has the power to move from place to
place at his own volition, as business or pleasure may prompt him.  He has
rights which are so important as to make it desirable that they should be
uniform throughout this broad expanded union; and which are needful in
order to promote mutual friendship and free social or business intercourse
among the people of the several states.  These rights were placed by this
clause of the constitution under the protection of the federal government.
In the case of corporations, no such reasons exist.  Corporations, even in the
states of their own creation, are not entitled to all the rights and privileges of
citizens of such states.  They cannot vote at elections; they are ineligible to
any public office; they cannot be executors, administrators or guardians;
they are artificial beings endowed only with such powers and privileges and
rights as their creator has thought proper to bestow upon them.  They have
not the power of locomotion, and of course are not fit subjects in the view
above expressed of the constitutional clause cited.”284
Also of interest to us is Potter’s discussion of the rule of ultra vires.
Although the doctrine of ultra vires was weakening by the end of the nine-
teenth century, Potter considered that the rule had been “recently intro-
duced” into the United States, and was of great interest because of “[t]he
great number of these [corporations], the vast interests of the people coming
within their control; the numerous novel questions arising out of their trans-
actions; and the mighty power wielded by them for good or evil.”285  Potter
allowed that the doctrine was not always clear in its application.286  But he
regarded it as being of critical importance in restraining the power of corpo-
282 See supra text accompanying note 87.
283 1 POTTER, supra note 278, at 356.
284 Id. (quoting Ducat v. City of Chicago, 48 Ill. 172, 180 (1868), aff’d, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 410 (1870)).
285 2 POTTER, supra note 278, at 652–53.
286 Id. at 653.
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rations, which were “often influencing, and sometimes even overshadowing
the power and policy of the government itself.”287
Corporate law in the academy was not static in this time.  Victor
Morawetz, in his Law of Private Corporations in 1882, “proposed a radical rein-
terpretation of the legal status of the corporation.”288  In Morawetz’s non-
traditional view, a corporation was akin to a partnership;289 a corporation’s
charter was a contract among the stockholders, not between the stockholders
and the state.290  But Morawetz’s associational view of the corporation did
not lead him to ascribe greater rights to it than other writers.  The state could
reserve to itself the right to alter or repeal the charter in its general incorpo-
ration law.291  Furthermore, the state could regulate the corporation’s activi-
ties with general legislation, such as laws preventing nuisance, regulations on
companies “affecting the public interest” (such as railroads), and tax laws,292
as well as special legislation affecting only individual corporations.293
Morawetz acknowledged that there were constitutional limits on a state’s abil-
ity to interfere with corporations, but, much like Justice Field, noted that
these limits only prevented infringement of corporations’ contractual or
property rights.294  For example, a state could not confiscate the property
owned by the stockholders in corporate form.295  But, again, there is no ink-
ling that the state was without the power to regulate a business corporation’s
287 Id. As he wrote:
This view of the powers and influence of corporate bodies, presents the necessity
of the existence in our jurisprudence of the exercise of legal safeguards for the
government and the people; this can now be exercised in the administration of
the principles of law under that feature of it called ultra vires.
Id.  Potter also noted that the doctrine of ultra vires stemmed from the Dartmouth College
conception of the corporation as one that “possesse[d] only those properties which the
charter confers upon it either expressly or as incidental to its very existence.” Id. at 652 n.2
(quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
288 Horwitz, supra note 88, at 203.
289 Id.
290 2 VICTOR MORAWETZ, THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1045–47, at 1002–08
(2d ed. 1886).
291 Id. § 1095, at 1057 (“When the legislature enacts a charter or general incorporation
law containing a reservation of the power of alteration, it in effect authorizes the formation
of a corporation only on condition that the shareholders shall consent that the State may
exercise such control over the company as the power of alteration implies; and the persons
forming a corporation under such a charter or law must be held to assent to this condition,
and voluntarily to confer the power upon the State.”).  The idea of a state reserving to itself
the power of altering the rights granted in a charter can be traced to Justice Story’s concur-
ring opinion in Dartmouth College.  Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819) (Story, J., concurring).
292 2 MORAWETZ, supra note 290, §§ 1061–75, at 1022–38.
293 Id. § 1080, at 1042–43.
294 Id. § 1063, at 1023 (“[A]ll the important constitutional provisions regarding prop-
erty and contract rights apply to persons under all circumstances, and therefore to persons
who have formed a corporate association.”).
295 Id. § 1104, at 1067.
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involvement in the political process, or that any corporation possessed any
right to act on that process.
Any mention of a corporation’s right to become involved in the political
process is also lacking from William Cook’s treatise on corporate law,
updated in a third edition in 1894 and “widely used around the turn of the
century.”296  Cook’s treatise was thoroughly modern: he discusses the legal
treatment of derivatives such as puts, calls, and straddles.297  But he neverthe-
less defines a corporation in the same way as Chief Justice Marshall: “[A]n
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of
law.”298
Cook acknowledged that corporate law was relaxing its restrictions on
corporations: the theory that a private corporation has no powers other than
those expressly given or necessarily implied “is no longer strictly applied.”299
This is because a stockholder retained the right to object to the corporation’s
acts, which might otherwise be ultra vires and illegal, and the state had no
need or desire to interfere in the affairs of a private corporation.300  But a
state could still step in and limit the implied powers of a corporation when
public policy so required, such as when corporations did, in their corporate
capacity, things only humans could do individually.301
A state could also amend a corporate charter, when doing so was in the
public interest.302  Likewise, a state could repeal a charter under quo war-
ranto or scire facias, for example where the corporation had failed to use its
corporate privileges.303  But Cook also noted that states were now competing
for charters: where one state was “hostile or unduly restrictive or exacting in
its requirements from corporations . . . . [t]he charters are taken out else-
where.”304  Cook noted that New Jersey was the favored destination of these
corporations: it permitted incorporation “for any lawful business or purpose
whatever,” and had attracted large numbers of corporations from New
York.305
296 Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Govern-
ance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112 (2004) (referring to WILLIAM
W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW (3d ed. 1894)).
297 1 COOK, supra note 296, ch. XX, § 344, at 472.
298 Id. ch. I, § 1, at 1–2 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)).
299 Id. ch. I, § 3, at 5.
300 Id.
301 Id. (as a matter of public policy, railroads did not have the implied powers to sell
property just as individuals might); see also 2 COOK, supra note 296, ch. XL, § 681, at
971–73 (same); cf. State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892) (the
Standard Oil Company was not permitted to transfer its property to a trust, even though
the individual stockholders would have been permitted to).
302 1 COOK, supra note 296, ch. XXVIII, § 501, at 634–35.
303 Id. ch. XXXVIII, § 635, at 869–70.
304 2 COOK, supra note 296, ch. LVI, § 934, at 1603.
305 Id. ch. LVI, § 935, at 1604 (citations omitted).
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But as we discussed earlier, just as incorporation statutes became more
liberal toward the end of the nineteenth century, other sources of regulation
arose to take their place.306  We discuss these twin phenomena next.
D. The Further Growth of External Regulation
State and federal regulation bloomed after the Civil War.307  The main
object of regulation was still the railroads; state railroad commissions, largely
toothless before 1860, finally acquired the power to fix railroad rates.308  The
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the power of that state to fix railroad rates
in 1874, noting that “such aggregations of capital and power, outside of pub-
lic control, are dangerous to public and private right; and are practically
above many public restraints of the common law.”309  Insurance and banking
were also increasingly regulated in this period.  By 1905, twenty-two of the
then-forty-five states of the union had insurance commissions, up from twelve
in 1873.310  Public health laws, which affected businesses producing food and
drugs, were passed in growing numbers.311  At the state and local level, regu-
lation also grew: American Bar Association reports from the final quarter of
the century contain law after law on business practices, labor relations, and
employment conditions.312  Another scholar has described American eco-
nomic life in the nineteenth century as being under a “deluge” of local and
state restrictions.313
But the main restrictions on business corporations were federal.  To
remedy the inability of individual states to regulate interstate commerce, in
1887 Congress established the Interstate Commerce Commission, the first
federal independent regulatory commission.314  In 1890, Congress enacted
the Sherman Antitrust Act,315 which became an effective weapon against
306 See supra Section V.C.
307 In a thorough review of how corporations attempted to use the Bill of Rights to
advance their interests, Professor Mayer links the rise of externality regulation of the
increasingly powerful corporations that arose after the move to general corporation laws to
corporate interest in using the Constitution to restrict regulation of their activities.  Mayer,
supra note 276.  As he notes, when corporations were specifically chartered by government,
their activities were restricted in their charters, minimizing the need for more general
prudential regulation. Id. at 584.  After specific chartering gave way to authorizing the
formation of corporations under more enabling general corporation statutes, substantive
legislation regulation externality risks created by corporate activity became common, and
corporations used constitutional litigation to attempt to invalidate or limit regulation. Id.
at 662 n.365.
308 FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 334–37.
309 Att’y Gen. v. Chi. N.W. Ry. Co., 35 Wis. 425, 530 (1874).
310 FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 332.
311 Id. at 345.
312 Id. at 332.
313 WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE 84 (1996).
314 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1206, 1216 (1986).
315 26 Stat. 209 (1890), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
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trusts, where state antitrust laws had failed.316  In the antitrust field, “the big
antitrust authority was federal,” not state.317  After the enactment of the
Sherman Act, the growth of federal regulation continued with the Transpor-
tation Act of 1920 and, later, the regulatory statutes of the New Deal.318  And
even during the so-called Lochner era, when courts invalidated social and eco-
nomic legislation on due process grounds, states’ ability to regulate their cor-
porations “was and remained expansive.”319
It was in the midst of this flowering of regulation that New Jersey passed
its liberal general incorporation law.  This statute was the brainchild of a New
York lawyer, James Dill, who in 1890 persuaded New Jersey’s governor that by
loosening the restrictions on corporations New Jersey could attract corpora-
tions from New York.320  Dill himself disputed that capital flooded into New
Jersey because that state had liberalized its laws; rather, he ascribed New
Jersey’s success to the stability and evenhandedness of its law, the ability of its
executive officers, and the quality of its judges and bar.321  Dill further
argued that other states had erroneously “adopt[ed] the utility provisions of
New Jersey’s laws without the elements of control and regulation, which lat-
ter are an essential and permanent part of her system.”322  But Dill was so
conscious of the need for regulation of corporations that he proposed a sys-
tem of federal incorporation, so that companies could not evade one state’s
requirements by reincorporating in another state.323
Dill did not get his wish for federal chartering.  And in 1912, Woodrow
Wilson, as governor of New Jersey, urged the state legislature to reform the
liberal incorporation statute by preventing corporations from holding other
companies’ stock—in essence, prohibiting holding companies.324  New
Jersey corporations relocated to Delaware, which had updated its corporation
law in 1899 to create a more inviting legal regime.325
But the old internal restraints on corporations were not abandoned
completely.  As we have noted, corporate law continued to give strong protec-
tions to stockholders by, for example, requiring them to unanimously
approve any extraordinary transaction, much stronger regulation of corpo-
316 For example, Ohio and Texas attempted to break up the Standard Oil Company,
but failed. FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 347.  The Department of Justice later succeeded.
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
317 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 610 (2003).
318 Rabin, supra note 314, at 1240.
319 Matthew J. Lindsay, In Search of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”, 123 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 55, 66 (2010).
320 See Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 160, 163–64 (1982).
321 James B. Dill, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11 YALE L.J. 273, 281 (1902).
322 Id.
323 Id. at 274 (“The country demands uniform corporate legislation, formulated upon
the good of the country as a whole, and not sectional legislation, state against state.”).
324 Roe, supra note 317, at 610.
325 Id. at 609–10, 610 n.69.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 48  4-APR-16 13:24
924 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
rate means than was contained in McCain-Feingold.326  And the ultra vires
doctrine continued to hold sway in the late nineteenth century as the pre-
dominant legal rule, although, as noted, it was weakening.327  In his 1897
treatise, Reuben Reese reiterated the orthodox doctrine that a corporation,
“[c]reated by the state . . . has such powers as the state has seen fit to give it—
only this and nothing more.”328  Therefore, any act that was not sanctioned
by a corporation’s charter was a nullity.329  Reese’s view was, as he admitted,
conservative and out of step with “some modern law writers.”330  Neverthe-
less, ultra vires remained an important consideration throughout the nine-
teenth century and into the twentieth.331  As late as 1915, corporations were
not allowed to donate money to charitable organizations, even if the dona-
tion might ultimately benefit the corporation.332  And, of particular interest
to our inquiry, at least two courts shortly after 1900 ruled that political dona-
tions made by managers and directors were ultra vires.333
These applications of the ultra vires doctrine, together with the ever-
increasing growth of external regulation of corporations, cast doubt on the
assertion that the government was without power after the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a corporation from involving itself in the
political process, much less to regulate, as per McCain-Feingold, the means
by which it could do so.  To the contrary, we draw the conclusion that govern-
ment could comprehensively control a corporation’s activities, with the sole
limitation that it could not unconstitutionally interfere with the corporation’s
property rights.  As a final piece of evidence, we now conduct a brief histori-
326 See supra note 209; see, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590,
596 (1921) (“[A] majority of the stock may not authorize the sale of all of the property of a
going and not unprofitable company, [because] . . . such power would defeat the implied
contract among the stockholders to pursue the purpose for which it was chartered.”).
327 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 100, at 395–96; Hovenkamp, supra note 135, at 1665.  The
writ of quo warranto, by contrast, fell into disuse. HURST, supra note 16, at 161.
328 REUBEN A. REESE, THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF ULTRA VIRES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 19, at 29 (1897).
329 Id.
330 Id. at v; see also Walter C. Douglas, Jr., The True Doctrine of Ultra Vires, 45 AM. L. REG.
414, 414 (1897) (book review).
331 See generally Clyde L. Colson, The Doctrine of Ultra Vires in United States Supreme Court
Decisions, 42 W. VA. L. Q. 179 (1936); see also Cent. Transp. Co. v. Pullman’s Palace Car Co.,
139 U.S. 24, 53 (1891) (the appellant’s contract to transfer its railway car manufacturing
business to the appellee was void under the doctrine of ultra vires, and, independently,
void because it worked an unreasonable restraint of trade).
332 See, e.g., Brinson Ry. Co. v. Exch. Bank of Springfield, 85 S.E. 634, 635 (Ga. Ct. App.
1915).
333 See McConnell v. Combination Mining & Milling Co., 76 P. 194, 199 (Mont. 1904)
(“[Political contributions] were clearly outside of the purposes for which the corporation
was created . . . .”); People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80 N.E. 383, 387 (N.Y. 1907) (“The
company had not the right, under the law of its existence, to agree to make contributions
for political campaigns, any more than to agree to do other things foreign to its
charter . . . .”).
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cal survey of campaign finance laws—the type of law that was struck down in
Citizens United.
E. Campaign Finance Laws
The period after the turn of the twentieth century saw the enactment of
the first campaign finance laws—motivated, as Professor Briffault has noted,
to ward off the “particular danger of ‘corrupting the elector and debauching
the election.’”334  Reform was motivated by concerns about the influence
powerful corporations had over government, as well as concerns about cor-
porate officers misusing funds to further their own interests.335  Prominent
politicians such as Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root called for regulation
of corporate involvement in politics.  In President Roosevelt’s 1905 Congres-
sional address, he stated:
All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any politi-
cal purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted
to use stockholders’ money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition
of this kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the
evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.  Not only should both the National
and the several State legislatures forbid any officer of a corporation from
using the money of the corporation in or about any election, but they should
also forbid such use of money in connection with any legislation save by the
employment of counsel in public manner for distinctly legal services.336
Elihu Root similarly observed in an 1894 address:
 The use of money . . . at the hands of both of the great political parties in
this country that we find enormous contributions necessary to maintain
party machinery, to conduct party warfare . . . . [T]he effect is that great
moneyed interests, corporate and personal, are exerting yearly more and
more undue influence in political affairs. . . . [P]olitical parties are every
year contracting greater debts to the men who can furnish the money to
perform the necessary functions of party warfare.  The object of this amend-
ment is, by laying down a simple rule, to put an end, if possible, to that great
crying evil of American politics.337
Two of the statutes resulting from this political momentum were the fed-
eral Tillman Act and Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act.  These laws, of course,
postdate the Fourteenth Amendment by forty years, but their enactors were
still far closer in time to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment than
334 See Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban, 49 VAL. U.
L. REV. 397, 407 (2015) (quoting United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163, 169
(W.D. Pa. 1916)).
335 Id. at 404–06.
336 Theodore Roosevelt, Message Communicated to the Two Houses of Congress at the Begin-
ning of the First Session of the Fifty-Ninth Congress (Dec. 5, 1905), in 4 PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES
AND STATE PAPERS 560, 595 (1910).
337 Elihu Root, The Political Use of Money (Sept. 3, 1894), in ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT
AND CITIZENSHIP 141, 143 (Robert Bacon & James Brown Scott eds., 1916).
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we are now.338  We focus on these two in particular because the Tillman Act
is the first federal law addressing corporate political spending, and the consti-
tutionality of the Montana act was litigated post-Citizens United.
The Tillman Act prevented corporations from giving direct contribu-
tions to federal candidates or their campaigns.339  The aim of the Tillman
Act was to reduce corruption and the perception of corruption.340  Another
purpose was to prevent the managers of firms from spending stockholders’
money in ways that the stockholders would not approve.341
The Tillman Act was challenged as unconstitutional in federal court by a
group of brewing corporations that were indicted for making contributions
to federal elections.342  In upholding the constitutionality of the Act, Judge
Thomson echoed Chief Justice Marshall’s Dartmouth College decision and
accepted as still good law that corporations are creatures of law that exist
solely to advance the public welfare:
 In the exercise of its prerogatives and to secure greater economy and
efficiency, the government has thought best that certain artificial bodies
should be created with certain fixed and definite powers; and acting within
certain prescribed limitations.  These artificial creatures are not citizens of
the United States, and, so far as the franchise is concerned, must at all times
be held subservient and subordinate to the government and the citizenship
of which it is composed.343
Nor was the court troubled by the First Amendment challenge: the chal-
lenged Act “neither prevents, nor purports to prohibit, the freedom of
speech or of the press.  Its purpose is to guard elections from corruption, and
the electorate from corrupting influences in arriving at their choice.”344
There is no record of an appeal of this decision, and members of Congress
338 These laws were not the first; that distinction belongs to Kentucky, which amended
its constitution in 1891 to ban the use of corporate funds to influence any election.  Adam
Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92
GEO. L.J. 871, 883 (2004) (citing KY. CONST. § 150 (1891)).
339 Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a) (2012)).
340 S. REP. NO. 59-3056, at 2 (1906) (“[The ban on corporate contributions] is in the
interest of good government and calculated to promote purity in the selection of public
officials.”).
341 41 CONG. REC. 22 (1906); 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905); Winkler, supra note 338, at
912–13 (noting that the Tillman Act’s main purpose was to protect stockholders by
preventing managers from misspending their money).
342 United States v. U.S. Brewers’ Ass’n, 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
343 Id. at 168.  The court concluded that obviously Congress could restrict the right of
federally chartered corporations and national banks to make political contributions.  The
court spent slightly longer on the question of whether Congress could restrict the ability of
state chartered corporations to make political contributions, but still concluded, with little
trouble, that Congress had the power to regulate its own elections.
344 Id. at 169.  As Professor Briffault has noted, “[b]efore the 1940s, the First Amend-
ment played little role in the judicial assessment of campaign finance restrictions.”  Brif-
fault, supra note 334, at 407.
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had only a very faint concern, if any, that the Tillman Act might be
unconstitutional.345
Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1912.346  The first sec-
tion of the statute provided that “[a] corporation may not make a contribu-
tion or an expenditure in connection with a candidate or a political
committee that supports or opposes a candidate or a political party.”347  The
law was enacted by a popular initiative in response to scandals caused by the
domination of Montana’s economy by copper interests.  In 1889, two “copper
kings,” William Clark and Marcus Daly, attempted to bribe voters to vote for
their choice of seat for the state capital.348  In 1899, Clark bribed the state
legislature to elect him to the U.S. Senate.349  In the early years of the twenti-
eth century, a third copper king, Augustus Heinze, “bought” two trial judges
in Butte and so secured favorable rulings in his legal battles with the Amalga-
mated Copper Company.350  In 1903, the Amalgamated Copper Company
showed its political clout by, in response to two court rulings against it, shut-
ting down its mining operations and putting four-fifths of the Montana labor
force out of work.351  The Company suffered such a backlash that it reduced
its political involvement and in 1906 the Montanan voters amended their
constitution to permit voter-sponsored ballot initiatives—i.e., legislation
enacted without the potentially corrupt intermediary of the state
legislature.352
But the Amalgamated Copper Company could not stay out of Montanan
politics for long, and in the 1909 legislative session sponsored an amendment
to the state’s general incorporation law that would allow it to control other
businesses.353  In 1910, the Company tried to ensure that the Republican
Party won a majority in the state legislature, and in 1911, the Company pre-
vented the Democrats in the legislature from electing their chosen candidate
as U.S. Senator and from enacting a direct primary law.354  Finally, through
an initiative process (because the legislature was corrupt), the state’s frus-
trated voters passed the Corrupt Practices Act to blunt the Amalgamated
Copper Company’s influence on state politics.
This restriction on political spending in Montana remained intact for
over six decades.355  It therefore seems to us contrary to our history to argue
345 See Winkler, supra note 338, at 925 n.368.
346 MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011).
347 Id.
348 Jeff Wiltse, The Origins of Montana’s Corrupt Practices Act: A More Complete History, 73
MONT. L. REV. 299, 302–03 (2012).
349 Id. at 303.
350 Id. at 303–04.
351 Id. at 304–05.
352 Id. at 308–09.
353 Id. at 311.
354 Id. at 314–17.
355 It was eventually held unconstitutional after the Supreme Court’s decision in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). See C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson,
420 F. Supp. 1254, 1266 (D. Mont. 1976), aff’d, 583 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1978).
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that the Constitution has always been understood to grant the same speech
rights to corporations as human beings, or that corporations have always
been understood to have a constitutionally protected right to spend treasury
funds on political campaigns.  Rather, the opposite appears to be the case.
As the Supreme Court of Michigan held in a 1916 case upholding the convic-
tion of a director of a brewing company that had donated $500 in a referen-
dum campaign against a local dry law: “The expenditure of the money of the
Lansing Brewing Company for election purposes cannot be deemed to be a
property right within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Such cor-
porations have no right to participate in the elective franchise.”356
Into the twentieth century, the predominant view of the corporation’s
relation to society remained as it had been.  The corporation was still largely
seen as an entity that only possessed what rights it was given, with the limited
extension to wield those constitutional rights closely associated with the prop-
erty rights of its members.  Although the ultra vires doctrine was in a weaker
form, it remained potent to police attempts by corporate managers to engage
in activities not closely related to its business, including political contribu-
tions.  Moreover, as soon as general corporation statutes emerged and the
internal constraints of corporate law, charters, and the ultra vires doctrine
began to loosen, external regulation of the corporation emerged without any
suggestion that corporations could object to that regulation.
VI. ORIGINALISM AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE RESTRICTIONS
We doubt the utility of interpreting the Constitution using the originalist
method advocated by Justice Scalia.  We tend to believe it does little to pro-
vide results that can be defended as the neutral product of ideologically free
reasoning.  Because judges are not historians, public understandings of terms
are themselves often disputed, and society (and its legislatures) acts in reli-
ance on interpretations made by prior generations, we are not confident that
any decision of the Court in 2015 can truly be driven by an accurate under-
standing of the public meaning of the Constitution in 1791 and 1868.357  But
we acknowledge that reasonable minds can and do differ on this subject, and
we have attempted to apply the originalist method that the concurring
originalists adhere to faithfully.  When we do so, we conclude that the
method cannot justify the result in Citizens United.  This is true whether we
only look at the ratification of the First Amendment in 1791, as Justice Scalia
did, or whether we look also at the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in 1868.  In fact, if an originalist approach is taken, the result in Citizens
United is harder, not easier to sustain.
356 People v. Gansley, 158 N.W. 195, 200 (Mich. 1916).  The Michigan Supreme Court
also rejected the brewing company’s argument on the basis of the free speech clause of the
Michigan Constitution. Id. at 201.  Although the court was equally divided, the dissent did
not challenge the court’s constitutional analysis, and only disagreed that the statute was
not designed to cover this kind of referendum. Id. at 201–02 (Brooke, J., dissenting).
357 See supra notes 21 and 65.
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Despite Justice Scalia’s words to the contrary, there is abundant evidence
that legislatures could restrict corporations’ ability to act on the public politi-
cal process at the time of the Founding and at the time of the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is difficult to ignore Chief Justice Marshall’s
understanding that corporations had only such rights as the legislature gave
them, especially when that widely cited understanding remained good law
well into the twentieth century.  If anything, our conclusion is understated
because the historical reality is that the public and jurists readily accepted
that the state had the ability to regulate corporations.358  It was unthinkable
in the mid-nineteenth century, as it was at the time of the Founding, that the
legislature should not be able to regulate corporations as it saw fit.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court’s willingness to
permit corporations to wield constitutional rights was selective and inconsis-
tent throughout the early twentieth century.  But as a general matter, the
Court was reluctant to allow corporations to assert rights that were deemed
personal in nature.  It is true that in certain Plessy-era rulings359 the Supreme
Court made blanket statements to the effect that it was already “well settled
that corporations are persons within the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”360  But those state-
ments merely echoed the unexplained holding to that effect in Santa
Clara,361 and the cases that the Court cited in support of those statements
reflected the nuanced rationale of Justice Field that we have discussed
above.362
And the Court did not ascribe to the view that corporations were the
same as human persons in all or even most cases.  Although in many
instances, the Court held that corporations could be considered “persons”
under the Fourteenth Amendment and invoke rights granted by specific
amendments in the Bill of Rights (as incorporated against the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment), that was not invariably the case.  Thus, the
Supreme Court, on the one hand, held that corporations are persons for
purposes of (i) the Fifth Amendment right to be free from double jeop-
358 HURST, supra note 16, at 113 (“[L]itigants accepted legislative chartering authority
and by failure to press the issue on the courts reflected pervasive community acceptance of
the legitimacy of legislative determinations as to how far the corporate device should be
used.”).
359 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
360 Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897); see also, e.g., Coving-
ton & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896) (“It is now settled that
corporations are persons within the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding
the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.”).
361 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
362 E.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889), cited in
Ellis, 165 U.S. at 154, and Sandford, 164 U.S. at 592; Pembina Consol. Silver Mining &
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 187, 189 (1888), cited in Ellis, 165 U.S. at 154, and
Sandford, 164 U.S. at 592; see supra Section VI.B.
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ardy;363 (ii) the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury;364 and (iii) the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.365  But
the Supreme Court has also held that (i) corporations are not persons for
purposes of the right to liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment;366 (ii) the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply to corpora-
tions;367 and (iii) corporations do not enjoy the same right to privacy as natu-
ral persons for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.368
As important, modern First Amendment law itself did not emerge until
the 1920s and ‘30s, as virtually all scholars acknowledge.369  For example, at
the time of Santa Clara, First Amendment jurisprudence itself was relatively
unevolved.370  In 1907, Justice Holmes wrote that “the main purpose of such
constitutional provisions [as the First Amendment] is ‘to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other govern-
ments,’ and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may
be deemed contrary to the public welfare.”371  In 1919, in Schenck v. United
States, Holmes adopted the “clear and present danger” test, holding that Con-
gress could criminalize certain speech in times of war.372  Only after
extended communications with Judge Learned Hand did Justice Holmes
write his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, in which he argued that
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market. . . . That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.”373
363 United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 576 (1977).  We take this
and the following examples from Professor Mayer’s work, see supra note 276.
364 Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 76–77 (1908).
365 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71 (1906).
366 Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (“The liberty referred to in
[the Fourteenth] Amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.”); see also infra
note 374 and accompanying text. But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
778–79 (1978) (rejecting as “untenable” the argument that a corporation’s First Amend-
ment rights must stem from its property rights under the Fourteenth Amendment).
367 Hale, 201 U.S. at 57–58.
368 Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65–66 (1974).
369 See, e.g., DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1:5
(2012); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877,
877 (1963).
370 Santa Clara Cty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886); see generally THOMAS HEALY,
THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED
THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013).
371 Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Com-
monwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313–14 (1825)).  This was the Blackstonian
view.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (“The liberty of the press is indeed
essential to the nature of a free state: but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.”).
372 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
373 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Ger-
ald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments
of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 732–33 (1975) (discussing Learned Hand’s influence on
Holmes).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL301.txt unknown Seq: 55  4-APR-16 13:24
2016] originalist  or  original 931
Accordingly, the Court meandered as it grappled with how much protec-
tion the First Amendment gave corporations in terms of the right to speak on
the same terms as human persons.  At some times, the Court seems to have
applied the Field rationale: when the speech of a corporation was integrally
related to its business function, that speech was protected.374  At others, it
held that First Amendment rights were personal ones that could not be
claimed by a corporation or labor union.375  Commercial speech was at times
given more limited protection than other speech because it was economic in
nature.376
Aside from the lack of a coherent rationale for these erratic rulings, what
is most striking is how they generally did not address the mundane and
accepted reality that as of the time of the adoption of the First Amendment
and the Fourteenth Amendment, corporations were understood to be crea-
tures of the state that could only undertake those activities that government
permitted.377  But it is easy to conceive that the Court might conclude that
when states authorized corporations, they were not subjecting those corpora-
374 See O’Kelley, supra note 9, at 1359–60 (discussing Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936)); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). Pierce applied
the Field rationale to the holding of Riggs: “Appellees are corporations and therefore, it is
said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees.  Accepted in the proper sense, this is true.  But they have business and property for
which they claim protection.” Id. (citing Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255
(1906)).
375 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939). Hague concerned the
constitutionality of certain municipal ordinances that prohibited the leasing of any venues
to subversive organizations without a permit and banned the distribution of pamphlets on
the streets. Id. at 501.  Justice Owen Roberts held that only the individual, and not the
corporate, plaintiff-respondents had standing to challenge the ordinances on the ground
that they abridged their right peaceably to assemble and engage in debate. Id. at 512–14.
“Natural persons, and they alone, are entitled to the privileges and immunities which § 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment secures for ‘citizens of the United States.’” Id. at 514
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).  Justice Roberts asserted that “it is clear that the
right peaceably to assemble and to discuss these topics . . . is a privilege inherent in citizen-
ship of the United States which the Amendment protects.” Id. at 512.
Justice Roberts was only joined by Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Black in this hold-
ing.  Justice Stone, joined by Justice Reed, came to the same result, but observed that the
Court in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551–52 (1875), had held that the right to
peaceable assembly was not secured against state action, and was not a “privilege and
immunity” of citizens of the United States under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hague, 307
U.S. at 526.  Therefore, Justice Stone rested his analysis on the Due Process Clause.  Rely-
ing on Riggs, he held that “[a]s to the [corporate plaintiff], it cannot be said to be deprived
of the civil rights of freedom of speech and of assembly, for the liberty guaranteed by the
due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.” Id. at 527 (citing Riggs,
203 U.S. at 255).  Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented, and Justices Frankfurter and
Douglas took no part in the decision.
376 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561–63
(1980).
377 See supra Parts IV–VI.
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tions to expropriation of their assets without compensation.378  It is less easy
to conceive of how the Court could conclude that the government could not
restrict corporations from acting on the political process using the wealth
they generated as a result in material part because of the special privileges
given them by the legislatures who authorized their creation.  To do so would
clash directly with the understanding that corporations had only such rights
as the society that created them chose to give them.379
Nor can evolution in academic theories of the firm justify Citizens United
in originalist terms.  Originalists would be the first to express dismay if the
meaning of the law as of the time of enactment was determined by reference
to later academic musings about the true nature of things.380  It may be, for
example, that the for-profit corporation is best seen as a mere “nexus of con-
tracts,”381 or as a distinct entity bringing together the firm-specific invest-
ments in a team of a variety of constituencies to be led by a board of directors
as team leader (team production),382 or as an association formed by investors
for mutual profit to be run on a direct democracy model,383 or a republican
democratic model.384  These explanatory and normative perspectives may
have their place in terms of influencing a policy debate within the political
branches about where law should evolve by legislative enactment; they have
no place in determining what the law meant as of 1791 and 1868, unless one
of those theories was widely accepted and could be understood to serve as a
contextual foundation for understanding the text of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
As of the relevant time, the operative legal understanding was practical,
not theoretical, and legislators understood themselves to be giving life to
entities that had only such rights as the law gave them.  Corporations were
still in their nascent stage as institutions, general corporation statutes in par-
ticular were in their infancy, and corporations were understood as impor-
tantly distinct from humans and as permitted to engage only in those
activities the positive law authorized.  Whatever later theories said about
378 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148
U.S. 312, 328 (1893).
379 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)
(“Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its
creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.”).
380 E.g., BORK, supra note 26, at 187–235.
381 E.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976) (“[M]ost organiza-
tions are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships
among individuals.” (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
382 E.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999).
383 E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 835 (2005).
384 E.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003).
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them cannot alter the reality that it was understood that corporations owed
their existence to law and were subject to its restrictions.
Thus, to explain the move to holding that the government cannot in fact
limit the activities engaged in by corporations, it seems necessary to embrace
the un-originalist notion that judicial glosses on the Constitution become
part of the Constitution’s meaning, and that that meaning evolves over time.
To this exact point, it was not until the Bicentennial year—1976—that
the Supreme Court equated the ability to spend money with the ability to
speak.385  In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court struck down the expenditure limit
placed on candidates’ campaigns by the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1976.  The Court reasoned that a restriction on expenditures “necessarily
reduces the quantity of expression,” and the restriction in the Act ($1,000
per candidate) was a “substantial . . . restraint[ ] on the quantity and diversity
of political speech.”386  By contrast, the Court upheld the Act’s restriction on
campaign contributions, because it entailed “only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”387
And it was not until 1978 that there was a meaningful discussion by the
Supreme Court of the extent to which corporations had First Amendment
rights that were protected in the context of the political process.  In First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court relied on Buckley to hold that a
Massachusetts law imposing criminal liability on corporations making
expenditures on ballot initiatives was unconstitutional.388 Bellotti illustrates
well how originalist reasoning does not easily support the invalidation of cam-
paign finance restrictions.  In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, stressed the state’s power to control its own corporations:
states that restricted corporate political activity sought to prevent “institutions
which have been permitted to amass wealth as a result of special advantages
extended by the State for certain economic purposes from using that wealth
to acquire an unfair advantage in the political process.”389  Or, more graphi-
cally: “The State need not permit its own creation to consume it.”390
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting separately, adopted the Field rationale.391
“There can be little doubt that when a State creates a corporation with the
power to acquire and utilize property, it necessarily and implicitly guarantees
that the corporation will not be deprived of that property absent due process
385 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
386 Id. at 19.
387 Id. at 20–21.
388 435 U.S. 765, 767–68, 776 (1978).
389 Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
390 Id.  The Bellotti majority replied that news corporations are able to participate in the
political process and have a greater ability to dominate political debate than non-media
corporations.  Id. at 781.
391 O’Kelley, supra note 9, at 1370 (“Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, was the only Justice to
recognize the importance and true meaning of the cases underlying the Field
rationale . . . .”).
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of law.”392  But, it does not follow that a corporation needs other constitu-
tional protections to carry out its business.  Justice Rehnquist wrote:
 I can see no basis for concluding that the liberty of a corporation to
engage in political activity with regard to matters having no material effect
on its business is necessarily incidental to the purposes for which the Com-
monwealth permitted these corporations to be organized or admitted within
its boundaries.393
There was no mention of originalism in Bellotti.394  But Justices White
and Rehnquist grounded their reasons in actual historical understanding bet-
ter than did the Bellotti majority or the concurring justices in Citizens United.
Given all the complexity that is involved in applying a constitution to
new disputes in a constantly changing society, it is not surprising to us that
current constitutional cases cannot be rationalized solely by current-day Jus-
tices based on the publicly understood meaning of the Constitution as of
1789 and 1868.  Rather, cases like Citizens United are best explained by the
reality that generations of intervening interpretations, when rendered in the
context of real disputes arising in a changing society, have an effect on the
meaning of the Constitution and how it applies in future cases.  In other
words, whether one finds favor with the holding in Citizens United or not, our
only claim is that the outcome in the case is not one that can easily be ratio-
nalized by applying the originalist method of interpretation.  To the con-
trary, the strong weight of the historical evidence would support the
constitutional validity of Congress’s right to regulate the corporation’s
involvement in the political process through the means set forth in McCain-
Feingold.  As such, the decision in Citizens United to overturn a bipartisan
statute appears to us more original than originalist.
392 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 824 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
393 Id. at 828.
394 Despite originalism’s name, it is a newfangled doctrine. See supra notes 20–21 and
accompanying text; see also POSNER, supra note 50, at 197.
